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
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FROM THE BEQUEST OF  
JOHN AMORY LOWELL

CLASS OF 1815





200



PROCEEDINGS

OF THE

Liverpool-Philomathic Society,

*(With which was Incorporated, June, 1878, the Liverpool Chatham  
Society, Established 1843.*

DURING ITS

SIXTY-FOURTH SESSION,

1888-89.

VOLUME XXXIV.

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
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**Officers and Council**  
DURING  
**THE SIXTY-FOURTH SESSION,**  
**1888-89.**

---

**Officers.**

---

**PRESIDENT—J. W. ALSOP, B.A.**  
**VICE-PRESIDENT—REV. J. POLACK, B.A.**  
**TREASURER—HENRY SMITH.**  
**HONORARY SECRETARY—W. FORSHAW WILSON.**

---

**Ordinary Members of the Council.**

---

**H. HODGSON BREMNER, B.A.**  
**E. M. HANCE, LL.B., L.C.P.**  
**ALBERT E. ISAAC.**  
**A. M. JACKSON.**  
**FRANK JOHN LESLIE, F.R.G.S.**  
**R. JOHN LLOYD, M.A.**  
**WILLIAM OULTON, J.P.**  
**WALTER PIERCE.**  
**THOMAS SNAPE.**  
**RICHARD STEEL.**  
**AUSTIN TAYLOR, B.A.**  
**GLYNN WHITTLE, M.A. CANTAB., M.D., M.R.C.P.**

---

**Place of Meeting.**

---

**THE ROYAL INSTITUTION, COLQUITT STREET, LIVERPOOL.**



## Members

AT THE CLOSE OF THE SIXTY-FOURTH SESSION;  
WITH THE YEAR OF THEIR ELECTION.

---

### Honorary Members.

---

1868.

RIGHT HON. VISCOUNT SHERBROOKE.

1886.

DR. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES.

1888.

J. RUSSELL LOWELL.

HIS HONOUR JUDGE HUGHES, Q.C.

---

### Ordinary Members.

---

1840.

JAMES SPENCE.

1849.

JOHN M'DIARMID.

WILLIAM B. MARSHALL, J.P.

FREDERICK A. TAMPLIN.

WILLIAM UNWIN.

1851.

EDWARD E. EDWARDS.

1852.

JOSEPH WHITE.

1854.

RICHARD NICHOLSON, J.P.

WILLIAM RADCLIFFE, J.P.

JAMES HAKES, M.R.C.S.

1855.

JAMES BARROW.

CHARLES SPENCE.

ELISHA SMITH, J.P.

1856.

SAMUEL SMITH, M.P.  
CHARLES S. SAMUELL.  
WILLIAM CROSFIELD, J.P.

1857.

EDMUND K. MUSPRATT, J.P.

1859.

FRANCIS JAMES BAILEY, L.R.C.P.  
SIR WILLIAM B. FORWOOD, J.P.

1860.

JOHN PEMBERTON.  
ROBERT MARQUIS.

1861.

PETER OWEN.  
HENRY JOSEPH HAMPSHIRE.  
ROBERT BRUCE STEEL.  
WILLIAM OULTON, J.P.  
THOMAS MAPLES.  
ALFRED WOODALL.

1862.

JOHN MELLADEW.  
ARTHUR B. FORWOOD, J.P., M.P.

1863.

ROBERT NICHOLSON.  
PHILIP H. BATHBONE, J.P.  
JOHN ELLIOT.  
THOMAS L. LEE.

1865.

HARRY S. SAMUEL.  
ARTHUR H. LEWIS.

1866.

GEORGE X. SEGAR, B.A.  
RICHARD STEEL.

1867.

THOMAS SNAPE.

1868.

ROBERT THOM.  
JAMES SMITH.  
A. W. RONALD.

1869.

FRED. WEVILL.  
ALEXANDER COGHILL.  
CHAS. F. FINNEY.  
MORRIS P. JONES.

1870.

JAMES BIRCHALL.

1871.

ROBERT JACKSON.  
GEORGE BELLMAN.  
ARCHIBALD GILLIES.  
EDWARD R. RUSSELL.  
BARON L. BENAS, J.P.

1872.

EDWARD M. HANCE, LL.B., L.C.P.  
JAMES HORNE.  
GEORGE M'FERRAN.  
GEORGE HENRY BALL.  
JAMES W. ALSOP, B.A.

1873.

J. B. MORGAN.  
THOMAS B. ROYDEN, J.P., M.P.  
THOMAS H. ISMAY, J.P.  
JOHN BLACKWOOD.  
WILLIAM TAPSCOTT.  
J. G. M'CANN.  
J. P. HETHERINGTON.  
D. NAYLOR.  
R. JOHN ROUSE.  
MILES BELL.  
JAMES SEWARD.  
ALFRED M. JACKSON.  
ANDREW B. PATON.  
HENRY HODGSON BREMNER, B.A.

1874.

JOHN DAWSON TYSON.  
WALTER PIERCE.  
JOHN HARVEY FARMER.  
WILLIAM WAINWRIGHT.  
WILLIAM BENNETT, JUN.  
WILLIAM B. MARSHALL, JUN.  
ALEXANDER ZICALIOTTI.  
JOHN P. FROST.  
WILLIAM BLOOD.  
J. W. SCHOLEFIELD, J.P.  
ADOLPH MEYER.

1875.

HENRY WAINWRIGHT.  
CHARLES E. STEVENS.  
GEORGE BROADBRIDGE.  
HENRY SMITH.  
THOS. OGILVY EASTON.  
PHINEAS A. BENAS.  
WM. H. WILLIAMS.  
LIONEL GOLLIN.  
HENRY A. TOBIAS.  
WILLIAM JACKSON.  
JOHN MERRITT WADE.  
FRANCIS WILLIS TAYLOR, M.A.  
HENRY HUNTINGTON.

1876.

HERMAN DECKER.  
EDWARD GRINDLEY.  
RICHARD HOLDEN DAVIES.  
LIEUT.-COL. JOHN PILKINGTON.  
RICHARD JOHN LLOYD, M.A.  
GEORGE TAYLOR.  
D. B. M'CULLOCH.  
DAVID B. COPPEL.  
ALFRED LOUIS BENAS.  
HUGH M'CUBBIN.  
JOHN HAROLD BIRCH.  
HENRY G. PIERCE, B.A.  
WILLIAM HENRY COATES.  
THOMAS HANMER.

JOHN CURRIE.  
ANTHONY G. SMITH.  
JOHN P. HARGREAVES, M.A.  
EDGAR S. HOLLAND.

1877.

STEPHEN WILLIAMSON, M.P.  
SIR J. A. PICTON, J.P., F.S.A.  
SAMUEL CROSS.  
JOHN W. RENNIE.  
WILLIAM ARTHUR WEIGHTMAN.  
JOSEPH P. BRUNNER.  
WILLIAM EVANS, JUN.  
ALFRED SAMUEL GRAVES.  
THOMAS FELL ABRAHAM.  
WILLIAM DWERRYHOUSE.

1878.

ARTHUR M'NEILL.  
THOMAS CLARKSON.  
ROBERT CASSON.  
THOMAS ROBINSON M'PHAIL.  
WILLIAM LEACH JACKSON.  
JOHN WASHINGTON WHINYATES.  
JAMES TYSON.  
GUSTAV SCHACK-SOMMER, PH.D.  
WILLIAM DANGER.  
EDWARD W. BINDLOSS.  
WILLIAM JOHN STEWART, B.A.  
WILLIAM MERRICK BOSTON.

1879.

GEORGE H. WEBB.  
WILLIAM HALSALL.  
C. H. KEET.  
R. CROOKE, JUN.  
ALBERT E. ISAAC.  
JOSEPH HESS.  
PHILIP S. LEVY.  
J. MILLER MUNN.  
EDWARD PRITCHARD.  
RICHARD BARNES GARDNER.  
FREDK. BROADBRIDGE.

JACOB SAMUEL.  
AUGUSTUS F. WARR.  
A. R. EVANS.  
W. H. DAVISON.

1880.

HUGH QUINN.  
JAMES SIMPSON.  
HAHNEMANN STUART.  
JOSEPH KITCHINGMAN.  
CHARLES WILLIAM MASSEY.  
J. S. HARMÓD BANNER.  
CHARLES R. ELLIS.  
ALFRED BRIGHT, M.A.  
GEORGE R. GUNTON.  
THOMAS QUINSEY, JUN.  
CHARLES H. BAXTER.  
W. FRANCIS TAYLOR, B.A.  
JAMES YOUNG.  
ROBERT A. JONES, B.A.  
HENRY BELL.  
JAMES BURTON, B.A.  
JAMES KIDMAN, M.A.

1881.

ABRAHAM LYONS.  
JOHN P. EGLEN.  
N. J. LIDSTONE.  
HENRY J. POLLIT.  
GLYNN WHITTLE, M.A., CANTAB., M.D., M.R.C.P.  
FRANCIS HARTLEY.  
RALPH HINDLE BAKER.  
FRANCIS J. B. KREITMAIR.  
JOHN BOWMAN HUNTER.  
THOMAS HENRY BARUGH MUZEEN.  
E. C. G. LOTT.  
PATRICK B. DEUCHAR.  
ALFRED CORNETT.  
LOUIS S. COHEN.  
JOHN R. B. SCOTT.  
FRANCIS CHATILLON DANSON.  
CHARLES TAYLOR TYRER.

SAMUEL C. WOODWARD.  
 J. B. WATERHOUSE.  
 FRANK JOHN LESLIE, F.R.G.S.  
 Rev. JOSEPH POLACK, M.A.  
 JAMES M'COMB.  
 WILLIAM DAVEY.  
 ALFRED L. JONES.  
 FREDERICK SMITH.  
 V. A. HAMPSHIRE.  
 JOHN CONNING, JUN.  
 CHRISTOPHER G. MILL.

1882.

ALFRED WILLIAM NEWTON, M.A.  
 WILLIAM ROCK.  
 JAMES HANDLEY, J.P.  
 ROBERT W. HUDSON, B.A.  
 HOWARD C. BANISTER.  
 EDWARD CORNISH.  
 JOHN FARRINGTON ELLISON.  
 JOHN PENNEY.  
 W. E. TAYLOR.  
 WILLIAM WATSON RUTHERFORD.  
 WILLIAM HENRY LLOYD.  
 LOUIS SOLOMON.  
 ROBERT HULME.  
 JOSEPH McKENNA.  
 C. J. REMFRY.  
 WILLIAM CARTER, M.D.  
 HENRY S. S. JAMES.  
 ALEXANDER COGHILL, JUN.  
 JOHN MacCONNAL.

1883.

FREDK. M. RADCLIFFE.  
 JAS. A. DOUGHAN.  
 A. NORMAN TATE, F.I.C.  
 THOS. LINTON.  
 EDWARD LEWIS LLOYD.  
 JAS. BECKETT.  
 D. L. BECKETT.  
 ROBERT O. WILLIAMS.

RICHARD IBBETSON POWELL.  
 JAMES SPARROW.  
 WM. BULLEN, JUN.  
 W. H. MORRISON.  
 WM. A. SMITH.  
 WILSON SHELMERDINE.  
 H. C. REYNOLDS.  
 SIMON JUDE.  
 AUSTIN TAYLOR, B.A.  
 H. T. JOHANNING.  
 ALEX. E. LEITCH.  
 JAMES FINNEY.  
 W. FORSHAW WILSON.  
 ARTHUR J. PRESTON.  
 W. H. PRIDE.  
 OSWALD H. RATHBONE.  
 FRED. W. BLOOD.  
 W. H. KEET.

1884.

T. A. WOOLLEY.  
 S. J. WARING, JUN.  
 JOSEPH GREGSON.  
 EDWARD F. CALLISTER.  
 THOS. WHITEHEAD.  
 WALTER LOWNDES.  
 F. A. GREER, M.A.  
 GEO. R. LEYLAND.  
 JOHN RUTHERFORD, LL.B.  
 T. F. BRAKELL.  
 J. RANKIN.  
 JAS. H. GOODYEAR.  
 W. STANLEY ELLISON.  
 HENRY MAXWELL SAVAGE.  
 ANGUS WM. GAIR.  
 ROBERT KLOMBIES.  
 C. Y. C. DAWBARN, M.A.  
 HENRY C. CROSFIELD.  
 G. S. IRVEN.  
 C. W. HARVEY.  
 HAROLD SUMNER.  
 HARRIS P. CLEAVER.

JOHN HUGHES, JUN.  
 T. W. OAKSHOTT, J.P.  
 B. H. HILTON.  
 JOHN VANDALLE.  
 A. K. CANNINGTON.  
 THOMAS BUXTON.

1885.

T. H. BANKIER.  
 T. GORDON HARROWER.  
 MARK HOWARTH.  
 A. E. MOORHOUSE.  
 J. A. SINCLAIR.  
 JOHN C. BROMFIELD.  
 PAUL SPRINGMANN.  
 F. W. EDWARDS.

1886.

HERBERT J. HOLME.  
 W. R. JONES.  
 ARCHIBALD WILLIAMSON.  
 T. B. BEWSHER.  
 R. A. HAMPSON.  
 E. D. SYMONDS.  
 T. G. WILLIAMSON.  
 T. D. SYERS.  
 J. H. TILLMAN.  
 SAMUEL BARKER.  
 GEORGE HUGHES.  
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 W. B. BUTTERS.  
 E. J. BOUMPHREY.  
 HERBERT REYNOLDS RATHBONE, B.A.  
 ALAN H. BRODRICK.  
 A. G. RANKINE.

1887.

GEORGE G. MACKAY.  
 GEORGE W. WEISS.  
 CHARLES R. ALDRICH.  
 ISAAC MORRIS.

CLARKE ASPINALL, J.P.  
 OSWALD DOBELL.  
 WILLIAM JONES.  
 F. H. MORT.  
 C. H. SPENCE.  
 J. C. EATON.  
 ALAN S. REYNOLDS.  
 SAMUEL VEEVERS.  
 STANLEY A. LATHAM.  
 CHARLES LESLIE.  
 WALTER HIGGINS.  
 LAURENCE McLAREN.  
 A. B. THORNELY.  
 T. SMYTHE HUGHES.  
 FRANK BOWER.  
 R. LLOYD PHILLIPS.  
 A. C. STEPHENSON.  
 J. B. WALLACE.

1888.

O. H. HARDY, M.A.  
 ERNEST W. PIERCE.  
 JOHN DUN.  
 JOHN DAVIES, B.A., LL.B.  
 JOHN JARVIS.  
 JOHN YATES.  
 HENRY E. RENSBURG.  
 RUSSELL REA.  
 A. T. MILLER.  
 R. HUGHES JONES.  
 JOHN EDWARDS, JUN.  
 C. W. STUBBS, M.A.  
 JOHN McCUNN, M.A.  
 ANDREW CECIL BRADLEY, M.A.  
 J. KIRKE CROOKE.  
 JOHN MARQUIS.  
 THOMAS BELL.  
 FRANK WHITE.  
 HARRY S. BADGER.  
 WALTER DIGBY THURNAM.  
 VITTORIO DECIANI.  
 BERNARD NIGGERMANN.

CHARLES H. SWENY.  
 WALTER LEIGH GORST.  
 ARTHUR GREER.  
 HENRY D. SMITH.  
 J. L. McCULLOCH.  
 ANDREW RAE BANKS, LL.D.  
 W. P. WHITTY, B.A.  
 T. D. LAURENCE.  
 W. RUDD.  
 J. J. SHALLCROSS.

1889.

ANDREW GLOVER INGLIS.  
 HENRY F. MOORE.  
 JOHN HAND.

---

A list of the names of the Members, arranged alphabetically, with their addresses, will be found at the end of the volume. Any errors therein should be notified to the Secretary.

# List of the Officers

OF THE

## LIVERPOOL PHILOMATHIC SOCIETY,

*From its Foundation to the close of the SIXTY-FOURTH SESSION.*

| DATE.    | PRESIDENTS.           | VICE-PRESIDENTS.                        | TREASURERS.                    | HON. SECRETARIES. |
|----------|-----------------------|---|--------------------------------|-------------------|
| 1825-26. | Robert M'Adam.        | { C. T. Dunlevie.<br>James Aikin.       | Joseph Shipley.                | William Hurry.    |
| 1826-27. | William Hurry.        | { C. T. Dunlevie.<br>James Aikin.       | "                              | W. A. Brown.      |
| 1827-28. | John Eason.           | { R. Lyons.<br>T. O. Cooper.            | Robert M'Adam.                 | "                 |
| 1828-29. | David Lamb.           | { John Eason.<br>Dr. Collins.           | "                              | "                 |
| 1829-30. | W. A. Brown.          | { Chas. Holland.<br>Jas. Richardson.    | "                              | David Lamb.       |
| 1830-31. | R. B. Dowling.        | { W. A. Brown.<br>M. D. Lowndes.        | T. O. Cooper.                  | R. A. Payne.      |
| 1831-32. | Joseph Lacon.         | { David Lamb.<br>Richard Shiel.         | "                              | "                 |
| 1832-33. | R. A. Payne.          | { William Hurry.<br>G. William Crooke.  | "                              | Swinton Boulton.  |
| 1833-34. | John Eden.            | { Edward Fletcher.<br>John S. Radcliff. | R. A. Payne.                   | W. J. Tomlinson.  |
| 1834-35. | G. J. Duncan, M.D.    | { T. O. Cooper.<br>Matthew Jamieson     | "                              | "                 |
| 1835-36. | W. J. Tomlinson.      | { T. O. Cooper.<br>G. J. Duncan, M.D.   | R. A. Payne.<br>Rich. Johnson. | Francis Mill.     |
| 1836-37. | "                     | { Charles Holland.<br>Francis Mill.     | R. A. Payne.                   |                   |
| 1837-38. | Edward Heath.         | { Swinton Boulton<br>G. Bolton.         | "                              | Chas. F. Salt.    |
| 1838-39. | Swinton Boulton.      | { William Grey.<br>W. H. Duncan.        | "                              | "                 |
| 1839-40. | John Sorley.          | { Thomas Avison.<br>Richard Johnson.    | "                              | "                 |
| 1840-41. | J. Dickinson, M.D.    | { G. B. Highfield.<br>Henry Chapman.    | "                              | "                 |
| 1841-42. | F. T. Grayling.       | { Swinton Boulton.<br>James Spence.     | "                              | H. Edwards.       |
| 1842-43. | T. Eden, M.R.C.S.     | { C. G. Cowie.<br>Jas. Lewin.           | "                              | William Porter.   |
| 1843-44. | F. H. Rankin.         | { H. Chapman.<br>William Fisher.        | "                              | "                 |
| 1844-45. | John Aikin.           | { H. Edwards.<br>William Porter.        | "                              | Edward Berry.     |
| 1845-46. | C. E. Rawlins, jun.   | { H. Chapman.<br>A. Hope.               | "                              | Arch. M'Laughlin. |
| 1846-47. | Chas. Tinling.        | { J. H. Macrae.<br>Geo. Louthean.       | "                              | "                 |
| 1847-48. | Fred. Pennington.     | Fred. Frodsham.                         | "                              | "                 |
| 1848-49. | J. A. Pierson, F.S.A. | Ed. Warren.                             | "                              | "                 |
| 1849-50. | A. Baruchson.         | John Forshaw.                           | "                              | "                 |
| 1850-51. | Richard Fry.          | John M'Laughlin.                        | "                              | "                 |
| 1851-52. | James Lord.           | F. W. Bloxam.                           | "                              | "                 |
| 1852-53. | George Harding.       | Arch. M'Laughlin.                       | "                              | John M'Laughlin.  |
| 1853-54. | James Spence.         | John M'Diarmid.                         | "                              | "                 |

| DATE.    | PRESIDENTS.                   | VICE-PRESIDENTS.               | TREASURERS.  | HON. SECRETARIES.                            |
|----------|-------------------------------|--------------------------------|--------------|--|
| 1854-55. | William Rowett.               | W. B. Marshall.                | R. A. Payne. | John M'Laughlin.                             |
| 1855-56. | Alexander Sleigh.             | Richard Lowndes.               | "            | "  |
| 1856-57. | James Birch.                  | William Unwin.                 | "            | "  |
| 1857-58. | Thos. Woodburn.               | J. T. Foard.                   | "            | "  |
| 1858-59. | J. Johnson Stitt.             | James Dowie.                   | "            | "  |
| 1859-60. | D. Buxton, Ph.D.              | Charles Clark.                 | "            | "  |
| 1860-61. | Alfred H. Cowie.              | David Bell.                    | "            | "  |
| 1861-62. | A. Baruchson.                 | Charles Cummins.               | "            | "  |
| 1862-63. | W. Ihne, Ph.D.                | J. C. Redish.                  | "            | "  |
| 1863-64. | Thos. Chilton.                | Elisha Smith.                  | "            | "  |
| 1864-65. | Wm. Mathison.                 | Samuel Smith.                  | "            | Wm. Clare.                                   |
| 1865-66. | J. Hakes, M.R.C.S.            | E. K. Muspratt.                | "            | "  |
| 1866-67. | R. Johnson.                   | H. J. Hampshire.               | "            | Thos. Banks.                                 |
| 1867-68. | P. H. Rathbone.               | E. S. Bradyll.                 | "            | Robt. Nicholson.                             |
| 1868-69. | W. B. Forwood.                | Tom Ham.                       | "            | "  |
| 1869-70. | Chas. Clark.                  | Richd. Steel.                  | "            | { Robt. Nicholson.<br>John M'Laughlin.       |
| 1870-71. | Samuel Smith.                 | H. S. Samuel.                  | "            | John M'Laughlin.                             |
| 1871-72. | W. B. Marshall.               | S. J. Capper.                  | "            | { B. Herdman Grindley.<br>J. J. Nixon.       |
| 1872-73. | William Unwin.                | Robert Nicholson.              | "            | J. J. Nixon.                                 |
| 1873-74. | Charlton R. Hall.             | Fred. Wevill.                  | "            | John M'Laughlin.                             |
| 1874-75. | Wm. S. Caine.                 | Wm. Oulton.                    | "            | "  |
| 1875-76. | A. B. Forwood.                | "                              | "            | "  |
| 1876-77. | E. R. Russell.                | Archibald Gillies.             | "            | "  |
| 1877-78. | F. J. Bailey, L.R.C.P.        | Thos. Snape.                   | "            | "  |
| 1878-79. | R. A. Payne.                  | Geo. X. Segar, B.A.            | Wm. Unwin.   | { John M'Laughlin.<br>Henry A. Tobias.       |
| 1879-80. | Fred. Wevill.                 | J. W. Alsop, B.A.              | Wm. Pierce.  | Henry A. Tobias.                             |
| 1880-81. | J. A. Picton, F.S.A.          | H. H. Bremner, B.A.            | "            | "  |
| 1881-82. | Richard Steel.                | Henry Smith.                   | "            | "  |
| 1882-83. | Thomas Snape.                 | A. M. Jackson.                 | "            | { Henry A. Tobias.<br>Frederick Broadbridge. |
| 1883-84. | Elisha Smith.                 | W. J. Stewart, B.A.            | "            | Frederick Broadbridge.                       |
| 1884-85. | Walter Pierce.                | E. M. Hance, LL.B.             | Wm. Unwin.   | "  |
| 1885-86. | H. Hodgson<br>Bremner, B.A.   | Glynn Whittle, M.A.,<br>M.D.   | Henry Smith. | "  |
| 1886-87. | Stephen William-<br>son, M.P. | Frank John Leslie,<br>F.R.G.S. | "            | W. Forshaw Wilson.                           |
| 1887-88. | Wm. Oulton, J.P.              | B. John Lloyd, M.A.            | "            | "  |
| 1888-89. | J. W. Alsop, B.A.             | Joseph Polack, B.A.            | "            | "  |

**STATISTICS OF THE SOCIETY FOR THE LAST  
FORTY-ONE SESSIONS.**

| SESSION. | Members at<br>commencement<br>of Session. | Ceased to be<br>Members dur-<br>ing Session. | Members added<br>during Session. | Number of<br>Members at<br>close of Session. | Largest Attend-<br>ance during<br>Session. | Smallest<br>Attendance<br>during Session | Average Attend-<br>ance during<br>Session. |
|----------|---|--|----------------------------------|--|--|--|--|
| 1848-49  | 59  | 8  | 18                               | 69   | 45   | 12                                       | 20   |
| 1849-50  | 69  | 12   | 13                               | 70   | 27   | 9  | 15   |
| 1850-51  | 70  | 10   | 10                               | 70   | 30   | 11                                       | 20   |
| 1851-52  | 70  | 2  | 11                               | 79   | 31   | 15                                       | 22   |
| 1852-53  | 79  | 9  | 25                               | 95   | 49   | 19                                       | 29   |
| 1853-54  | 95  | 5  | 47                               | 137  | 46   | 26                                       | 39   |
| 1854-55  | 137                                       | 13   | 39                               | 163  | 60   | 27                                       | 46   |
| 1855-56  | 163                                       | 14   | 43                               | 192  | 60   | 29                                       | 48   |
| 1856-57  | 192                                       | 20   | 26                               | 198  | 55   | 21                                       | 44   |
| 1857-58  | 198                                       | 52   | 16                               | 162  | 49   | 25                                       | 36   |
| 1858-59  | 162                                       | 18   | 19                               | 163  | 62   | 21                                       | 38   |
| 1859-60  | 163                                       | 10   | 36                               | 189  | 63   | 33                                       | 43   |
| 1860-61  | 189                                       | 19   | 28                               | 198  | 68   | 34                                       | 46   |
| 1861-62  | 198                                       | 18   | 33                               | 213  | 66   | 31                                       | 48   |
| 1862-63  | 213                                       | 17   | 36                               | 232  | 74   | 35                                       | 51   |
| 1863-64  | 232                                       | 20   | 28                               | 240  | 69   | 23                                       | 52   |
| 1864-65  | 240                                       | 17   | 21                               | 244  | 62   | 42                                       | 47   |
| 1865-66  | 244                                       | 41   | 18                               | 221  | 59   | 30                                       | 43   |
| 1866-67  | 221                                       | 25   | 16                               | 212  | 59   | 31                                       | 45   |
| 1867-68  | 212                                       | 32   | 16                               | 196  | 57   | 30                                       | 42   |
| 1868-69  | 196                                       | 14   | 26                               | 208  | 60   | 25                                       | 40   |
| 1869-70  | 208                                       | 15   | 22                               | 215  | 53   | 15                                       | 34   |
| 1870-71  | 215                                       | 12   | 17                               | 220  | 54   | 21                                       | 32   |
| 1871-72  | 220                                       | 36   | 14                               | 198  | 44   | 22                                       | 33   |
| 1872-73  | 198                                       | 26   | 12                               | 184  | 45   | 16                                       | 30   |
| 1873-74  | 184                                       | 11   | 81                               | 254  | 85   | 34                                       | 50   |
| 1874-75  | 254                                       | 13   | 25                               | 266  | 73   | 27                                       | 45   |
| 1875-76  | 266                                       | 14   | 50                               | 302  | 75   | 41                                       | 58   |
| 1876-77  | 302                                       | 30   | 43                               | 315  | 78   | 27                                       | 58   |
| 1877-78  | 315                                       | 21   | 26                               | 320  | 83   | 38                                       | 58   |
| 1878-79  | 320                                       | 61   | 36                               | 295  | 82   | 46                                       | 62   |
| 1879-80  | 295                                       | 22   | 40                               | 313  | 74   | 36                                       | 59   |
| 1880-81  | 313                                       | 30   | 45                               | 328  | 167  | 40                                       | 72   |
| 1881-82  | 328                                       | 24   | 39                               | 343  | 100  | 47                                       | 71   |
| 1882-83  | 343                                       | 20   | 32                               | 355  | 80   | 45                                       | 60   |
| 1883-84  | 355                                       | 24   | 46                               | 377  | 79   | 40                                       | 64   |
| 1884-85  | 377                                       | 37   | 37                               | 377  | 102  | 46                                       | 68   |
| 1885-86  | 377                                       | 37   | 13                               | 353  | 76   | 33                                       | 53   |
| 1886-87  | 353                                       | 21   | 28                               | 360  | 111  | 39                                       | 62   |
| 1887-88  | 360                                       | 34   | 22                               | 348  | 74   | 33                                       | 55   |
| 1888-89  | 348                                       | 27   | 34                               | 355  | 101  | 46                                       | 62   |

**DONATIONS**  
TO  
**The Liverpool Philomathic Society**  
DURING THE SESSION.

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"Proceedings of the Liverpool Geological Society, 1887-88."  
Presented by the Society.

"Proceedings of the Liverpool Naturalists' Field Club,  
1887-88." Presented by the Society.

"Thirty-Second Annual Report of the Committee of the  
Birkenhead Free Public Library."

"Journal of the Liverpool Astronomical Society." Presented  
by the Society.

"Transactions of the Liverpool Engineering Society." Pre-  
sented by the Society.

"Thirty-Sixth Annual Report of the Committee of the Free  
Public Library, Museum, and Walker Art Gallery of the City of  
Liverpool."

SUMMARY OF  
Questions Discussed during the Session,  
WITH THE DIVISIONS.

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I.

(*Discussed 10th and 24th October, 1888.*)

“Ought the Parnell Commission to have been restricted to an enquiry into definite charges against persons named?”

DIVISION.

*Affirmative*—17.

|

*Negative*—38.

II.

(*Discussed 7th November, 1888.*)

“Are the Australian Colonies justified in their present opposition to the immigration of the Chinese?”

DIVISION.

*Affirmative*—21.

|

*Negative*—12.

III.

(*Discussed 5th December, 1888.*)

“Should Compensation be paid to Publicans when the renewal of their Licences is refused through no default of their own?”

DIVISION.

*Affirmative*—19.

|

*Negative*—16.

IV.

(*Discussed 19th December, 1888.*)

“Is George Eliot or Thackeray the greater Novelist?”

DIVISION.

*George Eliot*—10.

|

*Thackeray*—13.

V.

(*Discussed 2nd January, 1889.*)

“Are Trade Combinations, of the nature of the Salt Syndicate recently floated, prejudicial to the best interests of the Community?”

DIVISION.

*Affirmative*—22.

|

*Negative*—1.

## VI.

*(Discussed 30th January and 13th February, 1889.)*

“Is it judicious to encourage the development of Local Self-Government in India.”

DIVISION.

*Affirmative*—10.

|

*Negative*—14.

## VII.

*(Discussed 27th February, 1889.)*

“Ought the recommendation of the Report of the Majority of the Royal Commission on Education, whereby the grant in favor of Voluntary Schools might be increased out of the rates, to be carried into effect?”

DIVISION.

*Affirmative*—14.

|

*Negative*—16.

## VIII.

*(Discussed 13th and 27th March, 1889.)*

“Is the adoption of the ‘One Man One Vote’ principle desirable at the present time?”

DIVISION.

*Affirmative*—20.

|

*Negative*—22.

## IX.

*(Discussed 10th April, 1889.)*

“Should the Law Officers of the Crown be debarred from private practice?”

DIVISION.

*Affirmative*—10.


|

*Negative*—15.**Paper**

READ 16TH JANUARY, 1889.

“RHETORIC.”

BY RICHARD STEEL.



## REPORT OF THE COUNCIL.

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SIXTY-FOURTH SESSION.

1888-89.

---

IN presenting the Annual Report for the past Session, the Council is glad to be in the position to record the continued prosperity of the Society.

There have been fifteen meetings during the Session, the average attendance at which compares favourably with the attendance in the previous session: 34 new Members have been elected; while through death, and other causes, the Society has lost 27 Members, leaving the total roll at the close of the Session, 355.

It is with regret that the Council has to record the death of Mr. Isham E. Gill, a former Vice-President.

The Society has also to deplore the deaths, since the close of the Session, of Sir James A. Picton, Kt., F.S.A., and Mr. H. Hodgson Bremner, B.A. Both these gentlemen had filled the office of President, and to each of them the Society is indebted for valuable services rendered.

The finances of the Society continue in a satisfactory state, there being a balance of £163 Os. 1d. in the hands of the Treasurer, exclusive of the Dock Bond for £200.

The Annual Dinner, which was held at the Adelphi Hotel, on 20th November, and at which Mr. J. Russell Lowell and His Honour Judge Hughes, Q.C., were the guests of the Society, was in every respect one of the most successful social gatherings in the annals of the Society.

Both of the distinguished guests were, by their permission, subsequently elected Honorary Members.

In consequence of the Art Congress, held in Liverpool last December, the Associated Soirée did not take place as usual, but delegates have been again appointed to make arrangements with the view of holding another Soirée of the Associated Societies in the ensuing winter.

PROCEEDINGS  
OF  
**The Liverpool Philomathic Society.**

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SIXTY-FOURTH SESSION, 1888-89.

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FIRST ORDINARY MEETING.

WEDNESDAY, 26th SEPTEMBER, 1888.

The president, Mr. J. W. ALSOP, B.A., in the chair.

Number of members present, 70.

*Private Business.*

The minutes of the last meeting of the last session were read and confirmed.

The hon. secretary announced, with regret, the deaths of Messrs. I. H. E. Gill and R. M. Bird; and the resignations of Messrs. R. W. Davies, R. A. Davies, Thomas Evans, A. R. Evans, F. J. Evans, R. Dunlop, R. A. Gillies, B. W. Ginsburg, W. Gregory, W. Hurndall, A. S. Ross, T. R. Shallcross, J. D. Shallcross, and A. B. Williamson.

The following questions out of a list of six submitted by the council were selected for discussion by the society:—

I.—“Ought the scope of the ‘Parnell Commission Act’ to have been limited to the genuineness of the disputed letters?”

II.—“Should compensation be paid to publicans when

---

the renewal of their licenses is refused through no default of their own ? ”

III.—“ Are the Australian Colonies justified in their present opposition to the immigration of the Chinese ? ”

The following donations to the library of the society were acknowledged :—

“ Proceedings of the Liverpool Geological Society, 1887-1888.”

“ Proceedings of the Liverpool Naturalists’ Field Club, 1887.”

“ Thirty-second Annual Report of the Committee of the Birkenhead Free Public Library.”

“ The Journal of the Liverpool Astronomical Society.”

#### General Business.

The session was opened with an address by the president, Mr. J. W. Alsop, B.A., after which Mr. William Oulton, J.P., proposed, and Mr. R. John Lloyd, B.A., seconded, “ That the best thanks of the society be tendered to Mr. Alsop for his address, and that he be requested to allow it to be printed in the Proceedings of the society.”

The motion was supported by Messrs. Elisha Smith, James Birchall, James Seward, W. Forshaw Wilson, and carried unanimously.

The president acknowledged the vote of thanks, and acceded to the request of the society.

(The Address will be found at page i of the Appendix to this volume.)

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## SECOND ORDINARY MEETING.

WEDNESDAY, 10th OCTOBER, 1888.

The president, Mr. J. W. ALSOP, B.A., in the chair.

Number of members present, 82.

**Private Business.**

The minutes of the last meeting were read and confirmed.

The hon. secretary announced, with regret, the death of Mr. William Douglas.

The following gentlemen were elected as ordinary members of the society :—

| CANDIDATES.                  | PROPOSERS.          | SECONDEES.          |
|------------------------------|---------------------|---------------------|
| Mr. John Davies, B.A., LL.B. | Mr. Arthur McNeill. | Mr. J. Kidman, M.A. |
| " John Jarvis.               | " Thomas Snape.     | " J. Handley, J.P.  |
| " John Yates.                | " J. P. McKenna.    | " W. F. Wilson.     |

The resignation of Mr. Thos. Craddock was given in and accepted.

**General Business.**

The president, Mr. J. W. ALSOP, B.A., in the chair.

It was announced that the Annual Dinner of the society would be held on the 21st November, and that the Hon. J. R. Lowell and His Honour Judge Hughes had accepted the invitation of the society to be present.

The debate was opened on the question as altered by the Society:—"Ought the 'Parnell Commission' to have been restricted to an enquiry into definite charges against persons named?"

**SPEAKERS.**

*Affirmative*—Messrs. J. Seward, A. P. Thomas, LL.D., and Thomas Snape.

*Negative*—Messrs. George X. Segar, J. H. Greer, M.A., and Henry Bell.

On the motion of Mr. Glynn Whittle, M.A., M.D., in the affirmative, and of Mr. Henry Smith in the negative, the debate was adjourned.

**THIRD ORDINARY MEETING.**

WEDNESDAY, 24th OCTOBER, 1888.

The president, Mr. J. W. ALSOP, B.A., in the chair.

Number of members present, 68.

**Private Business.**

The minutes of the last meeting were read and confirmed.

The following gentlemen were elected as ordinary members of the society :—

| CANDIDATES.            | PROPOSERS.             | SECONDEES.        |
|------------------------|------------------------|-------------------|
| Mr. Henry E. Rensburg. | Mr. James Kidman, M.A. | Mr. S. Cross.     |
| " Russell Rea.         | " Henry Smith.         | " Thos. Snape.    |
| Capt. A. T. Miller.    | " C. W. Massey.        | " A. S. Graves.   |
| Mr. R. Hughes Jones.   | " E. D. Symond.        | " R. O. Williams. |
| " John Edwards, Jun.   | " R. O. Williams.      | " E. D. Symond.   |

The resignation of Mr. R. Walter Baxter was announced.

**General Business.**

The adjourned debate was opened on the question :—

“Ought the ‘Parnell Commission’ to have been restricted to an enquiry into definite charges against persons named?”

**SPEAKERS.**

*Affirmative*—Messrs. Glynn Whittle, M.A., M.D., C. Y. C. Dawbarn, M.A., J. P. McKenna, James Kidman, M.A., and James Seward (in reply).

*Negative*—Messrs. Henry Smith, A. M. Jackson, B. H. Hilton, G. R. Gunton, and Henry Smith (in reply, in absence of Mr. G. X. Segar).

**DIVISION.**

*Affirmative*—17. | *Negative*—33.

**FOURTH ORDINARY MEETING.**

WEDNESDAY, 7th NOVEMBER, 1888.

The president, Mr. J. W. ALSOP, B.A., in the chair.

Number of members present, 62.

**Private Business.**

The minutes of the last meeting were read and confirmed.

The following gentlemen were elected as ordinary members of the society:—

| CANDIDATES.                  | PROPOSERS.         | SECONDEES.                |
|------------------------------|--------------------|---------------------------|
| Rev. C. W. Stubbs, M.A.      | Mr. W. F. Wilson   | Mr. Henry Smith.          |
| Professor J. MacCunn, M.A.   | Do.                | " F. A. Greer, M.A.       |
| " Andrew Cecil Bradley, M.A. | Do.                | " G. Shack-Sommer, Ph. D. |
| Mr. J. Kirke Crooks.         | Do.                | " A. M. Jackson.          |
| " John Marquis.              | Do.                | Do.                       |
| " Thomas Bell.               | Do.                | " H. Huntingdon.          |
| " Frank White.               | Mr. J. A. Doughan. | " W. Oulton, J.P.         |
| " Harry S. Badger.           | " H. C. Reynolds.  | " Alan T. Reynolds.       |
| " W. Digby Thurnam.          | " J. Kidman, M. A. | " A. W. Newton, M.A.      |
| " Vittorio Deciani.          | " G. Shack-Sommer, | " W. F. Wilson.           |
|                              | Ph. D.             |                           |

In consequence of the Annual Dinner of the society having been fixed for November 21st, that being the next ordinary meeting of the society, it was moved by Mr. W. Forshaw Wilson, seconded by Mr. Henry Smith, and carried, "That the society at its rising to-night be adjourned to this night four weeks."

The following questions, out of a list of six submitted by the council, were selected for discussion:—

I. "Is Thackeray or George Eliot the greater novelist?"

II. "Are Trade combinations of the nature of the Salt Syndicate, recently floated, prejudicial to the best interests of the community?"

III. "Ought the recommendation of the report of the majority of the Royal Commission on Education, whereby the grant in favour of Voluntary Schools would be increased out of the rates, to be carried into effect?"

#### General Business.

The debate was opened on the question:—"Are the Australian Colonies justified in their present opposition to the immigration of the Chinese?"

## SPEAKERS.

*Affirmative*—Messrs. A. M. Jackson, E. W. Bindloss, H. C. Reynolds, James Seward, C. Y. O. Dawbarn, M.A., F. A. Greer, M.A.,  
A. M. Jackson (in reply).

*Negative*—Messrs. Glynn Whittle, M.A., M.D., Arthur J. Preston, Ernest W. Pierce, B. J. Powell, R. John Rouse, John Yates,  
Glynn Whittle, M.A., M.D. (in reply).

## DIVISION.

*Affirmative*—21. | *Negative*—12.

## FIFTH ORDINARY MEETING.

WEDNESDAY, 5th DECEMBER, 1888.

The chair was occupied by Mr. A. M. JACKSON.

Number of members present, 70.

## Private Business.

The minutes of the last meeting were read and confirmed.

The following gentlemen were elected as ordinary members of the society :—

| CANDIDATES.             | PROPOSERS.           | SECONDEES.            |
|-------------------------|----------------------|-----------------------|
| Mr. Bernard Niggermann. | Mr. G. B. Gunton.    | Mr. C. H. Keet.       |
| " Charles H. Sweny.     | " B. J. Powell.      | " A. P. Thomas, LL.D. |
| " Walter Lee Gorst.     | " A. S. Graves.      | " C. W. Massey.       |
| " Arthur Greer.         | " Thomas Clarkson.   | " F. A. Greer, M.A.   |
| " Henry D. Smith.       | " Henry Smith.       | " Wm. Oulton, J.P.    |
| " J. Lucas McCulloch.   | " J. Kidman, M.A.    | " S. Cross.           |
| " Andrew Rae Banks,     | " Edward B. Russell. | " W. Forshaw Wilson.  |
| LL.D.                   |                      |                       |

The resignation of Mr. G. McCorquodale was given in and accepted.

The following donation to the library of the society was acknowledged :—

"The Journal of the Liverpool Astronomical Society, Nov., 1888."

**General Business.**

The vice-president, Rev. J. POLACK, B.A., in the chair.

The debate was opened on the question:—"Should compensation be paid to Publicans when the renewal of their licenses is refused through no default of their own?"

**SPEAKERS.**

*Affirmative*—Messrs. Austin Taylor, B.A., William Unwin, Geo. Taylor, and Austin Taylor, B.A. (in reply).

*Negative*—Messrs. Harry S. Badger, Thomas Snape, H. C. Reynolds, and Harry S. Badger (in reply).

**DIVISION.**

*Affirmative*—19 | *Negative*—16.

**SIXTH ORDINARY MEETING.**

WEDNESDAY, 19th DECEMBER, 1888.

Number of members present, 52.

The chair was occupied by the president, Mr. J. W. ALSOP, B.A.

**Private Business.**

The minutes of the last meeting were read and confirmed.

The following gentlemen were elected as honorary members of the society:—

| CANDIDATES.                                 | PROPOSERS.     | SECONDEES.          |
|---|----------------|---------------------|
| Mr. J. Russell Lowell,<br>Cambridge, U.S.A. | The President. | The Vice-President. |
| His Honor Judge Hughes, Q.C.,<br>Chester.   | Do.            | Do.                 |

The following gentlemen were elected as ordinary members of the society:—

| CANDIDATES.            | PROPOSERS.         | SECONDEES.            |
|------------------------|--------------------|-----------------------|
| Mr. W. P. Whitty, B.A. | Mr. J. Yates, B.A. | Mr. Elwy D. Symonds.  |
| " T. D. Laurence.      | " Thomas Snape.    | " Mark Howarth.       |
| " W. Rudd.             | " W. A. Smith.     | " J. W. Whinyates.    |
| " J. J. Shallcross.    | " E. W. Pierce.    | " A. P. Thomas, LL.D. |

**General Business.**

The debate was opened on the question :—"Is George Eliot or Thackeray the greater novelist?"

**SPEAKERS.**

*George Eliot*—Messrs. Fred. Wevill, J. Seward, Rev. J. Polack, B.A., A. M. Jackson, and Fred. Wevill (in reply).

*Thackeray*—Messrs. A. P. Thomas, LL.D., B. J. Powell, E. W. Pierce, F. A. Greer, M.A., and A. P. Thomas, LL.D. (in reply).

**DIVISION.**

*George Eliot*—10. | *Thackeray*—18.

**SEVENTH ORDINARY MEETING.**

WEDNESDAY, 2nd JANUARY, 1889.

Number of members present, 47.

**Private Business.**

The vice-president, Rev. J. POLACK, B.A., in the chair.

The minutes of the last meeting were read and confirmed.

The following gentleman was elected as an ordinary member of the society :—

| CANDIDATE.                | PROPOSER.              | SECONDER.       |
|---------------------------|------------------------|-----------------|
| Mr. Andrew Glover Inglis. | Mr. James Kidman, M.A. | Mr. F. Hartley. |

The secretary announced that Mr. Richard Steel had expressed his willingness to read a paper before the society upon "Rhetoric," and that the proposal had been approved by the council. On a vote being taken by ballot in accordance with the rules, Mr. Steel's offer to read the paper was unanimously accepted.

The treasurer presented his half yearly statement of account, shewing a balance to the credit of the society of £115 17s. 1d., exclusive of the Dock Bond for £200.

The vice-president requested Mr. Walter Pierce to assist the honorary secretary to audit the treasurer's accounts.

#### General Business.

The debate was opened on the question:—"Are trade combinations of the nature of the Salt Syndicate, recently floated, prejudicial to the best interests of the Community."

#### SPEAKERS.

*Affirmative*—Messrs. F. A. Greer, M.A., Thomas Snape, J. J. Shallcross, J. Tyson, C. Y. C. Dawbarn.

*Negative*—Messrs. J. P. Hargreaves, M.A., J. C. Eaton, E. W. Pierce, and J. P. Hargreaves (in reply).

#### DIVISION.

*Affirmative*—22.      |      *Negative*—1.

### EIGHTH ORDINARY MEETING.

WEDNESDAY, 16th JANUARY, 1889.

Number of members present, 101.

#### Private Business.

The vice-president, Rev. J. POLACK, B.A., in the chair.

The minutes of the last meeting were read and confirmed.

The resignation of Mr. E. G. Buckley was given in and accepted.

The following questions out of a list of six submitted by the council for discussion were selected by the society:—

I.—"Is the action of the Liverpool City Council in refusing to confirm the recommendation of the Library, Museum, and Arts Committee for the purchase of Sir Frederick Leighton's 'Captive Andromache' to be deprecated?"

II.—"Is the 'One man one vote' principle desirable?"

III.—“Is it judicious to encourage the development of Local Self Government in India ? ”

*General Business.*

A paper was read by Mr. Richard Steel upon “Rhetoric,” after which Mr. Samuel Smith, M.P. proposed, and Mr. Fred. Wevill seconded, “That the best thanks of the society be given to Mr. Steel for his paper, and that, with his permission, it be printed in the volume of Proceedings of the society.”

The motion was supported by the following gentlemen:—Messrs. Albert E. Isaac, A. Zicaliotti, Austin Taylor, B.A., A. P. Thomas, LL.D., and James Seward, and unanimously carried.

Mr. Steel acceded to the request of the society.

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NINTH ORDINARY MEETING.

WEDNESDAY, 30th JANUARY, 1889.

Number of members present, 49.

*Private Business.*

Mr. WALTER PIERCE occupied the chair.

The minutes of the last meeting were read and confirmed.

The following gentlemen were elected ordinary members of the society:—

| CANDIDATES.         | PROPOSERS.              | SECONDEES.              |
|---------------------|-------------------------|-------------------------|
| Mr. Henry F. Moore. | Mr. Austin Taylor, B.A. | Mr. S. J. Waring, Junr. |
| „ John Hand.        | „ James A. Doughan.     | „ J. P. McKenna.        |

The resignation of Mr. Alexander Carson was given in and accepted.

**General Business.**

The vice-president, Rev. J. POLACK, B.A., in the chair.

The debate was opened on the question :—"Is it judicious to encourage the development of Local Self Government in India ? "

**SPEAKERS.**

*Affirmative*—Messrs. James Seward, Fred Wevill, A. M. Jackson, and J. Tyson.

*Negative*—Messrs. E. W. Bindloss, Henry Smith, and Henry Bell.

The debate on the motion of Mr. C. Y. C. Dawbarn, M.A., seconded by Mr. Glynn Whittle, M.A., M.D., was adjourned.

**TENTH ORDINARY MEETING.**

WEDNESDAY, 13th FEBRUARY, 1889.

Number of members present, 38.

**Private Business.**

The chair was occupied by Mr. WALTER PIERCE.

The minutes of the last meeting were read and confirmed.

The hon. secretary announced with regret the death of Mr. T. W. Ellwood.

The following donations to the Library of the society were acknowledged :—

"The Journal of the Liverpool Astronomical Society."

"Transactions of the Liverpool Engineering Society."

The resignation of Mr. G. Crane was announced and accepted.

**General Business.**

The chair was occupied by Mr. A. M. JACKSON.

The debate was resumed on the question :—"Is it judicious to encourage the development of Local Self-Government in India?"

**SPEAKERS.**

*Affirmative*—Messrs. C. Y. C. Dawbarn, M.A., Thomas Snape, Albert E. Isaac, John Currie, James Seward (in reply).

*Negative*—Mr. Glynn Whittle, M.A., M.D., J. J. Shallcross, W. D. Thurnam, H. H. Bremner, B.A., E. H. Bindloss (in reply).

**DIVISION.**

*Affirmative*—10 | *Negative*—14.

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**ELEVENTH ORDINARY MEETING.**

WEDNESDAY, 27th FEBRUARY, 1889.

Number of Members present, 51.

**Private Business.**

The chair was occupied by Mr. E. M. HANCE, LL.B.

The minutes of the last meeting were read and confirmed.

**General Business.**

The vice-president, Rev. J. POLACK, B.A., in the chair.

The debate was opened on the question :—"Ought the recommendation of the report of the majority of the Royal Commission on Education, whereby the grant in favour of Voluntary Schools might be increased out of the rates, to be carried into effect?"

**SPEAKERS.**

*Affirmative*—Messrs. J. A. Doughan, G. Taylor, and J. A. Doughan (in reply).

*Negative*—Messrs. Thomas Snape, James Seward, and Thomas Snape (in reply).

**DIVISION.**

*Affirmative*—14. | *Negative*—16.

## TWELFTH ORDINARY MEETING.

WEDNESDAY, 13th MARCH, 1889.

Number of members present, 77.

### Private Business.

The vice-president, Rev. J. POLACK, B.A., in the chair.

The minutes of the last meeting were read and confirmed.

The following questions out of a list of six submitted by the council for discussion were selected by the society, viz.:—

I.—“Do the proposals of the Government for Naval Defence deserve the support of the country?”

II.—“Should the Law Officers of the Crown be debarred from private practice?”

III.—“Does the history of France during the last one hundred years tend to shew that a Republic is the best form of Government for that country?”

### General Business.

The vice-president, Rev. J. POLACK, B.A., in the chair.

The debate was opened on the question:—“Is the adoption of the ‘One man one vote’ principle desirable at the present time?”

#### SPEAKERS.

*Affirmative*—Messrs. E. R. Russell, Thomas Snape, James Seward, and R. J. Powell.

*Negative*—Messrs. J. W. Alsop, B.A., A. M. Jackson, John Currie, and F. A. Greer, M.A.

On the motion of Mr. Fred. Wevill in the affirmative, and Mr. Henry Smith in the negative, the debate was adjourned.

# THIRTEENTH ORDINARY MEETING.

WEDNESDAY, 27th MARCH, 1889.

Number of members present, 46.

## Private Business.

The chair was occupied by the vice-president, Rev. J. POLACK, B.A.

The minutes of the last meeting were read and confirmed.

The following donation to the library of the society was acknowledged:—"The Journal of the Liverpool Astronomical Society."

## General Business.

The adjourned debate on the question:—"Is the adoption of the 'One man one vote' principle desirable at the present time."

### SPEAKERS.

*Affirmative*—Messrs. Fred. Wevill, T. H. Tillman, Henry Bell, E. M. Hance, LL.B., and E. R. Russell (in reply).

*Negative*—Messrs. Walter Pierce (in absence of Mr. Henry Smith), O. H. Hardy, M.A., J. J. Shallcross, H. H. Bremner, B.A., and J. W. Alsop, B.A. (in reply).

### DIVISION.

*Affirmative*—20.

|

*Negative*—22.

# FOURTEENTH ORDINARY MEETING.

WEDNESDAY, 10th APRIL, 1889.

Number of members present, 59.

### Private Business.

The vice-president, Rev. J. POLACK, B.A., in the chair.

The minutes of the last meeting were read and confirmed.

The hon. secretary read a circular letter from the hon. secretaries of the Associated Soirée inviting the society to elect delegates to make arrangements for the next Soirée.

It was moved by Mr. Forshaw Wilson, seconded by Mr. Wm. Unwin, and carried, "That the president elect, hon. secretary elect, and Messrs. Steel and Snape be the delegates to the Associated Soirée, and that the subscription of £20 to the Guarantee Fund be continued."

The nominations for the offices of president, vice-president, hon. treasurer, hon. secretary for the next session, and for the six annual vacancies in the council were given in and announced.

Owing to the last meeting of the session taking place on Wednesday in Easter week, it was proposed by the president, seconded by Mr. E. M. Hance, LL.B., and carried, "That the meeting be postponed until the Wednesday following, viz: May 1st."

### General Business.

The debate was opened on the question:—"Should the Law Officers of the Crown be debarred from private practice?"

#### SPEAKERS.

*Affirmative*—Messrs. F. A. Greer, M.A., Wm. Unwin, Thomas Snape, Frederick Broadbridge, and F. A. Greer, M.A. (in reply.)

*Negative*—Messrs. H. H. Bremner, B.A., E. M. Hance, LL.B., B. H. Hilton, O. H. Hardy, M.A., and H. H. Bremner, B.A. (in reply.)

#### DIVISION.

*Affirmative*—10.      |      *Negative*—15.

# FIFTEENTH ORDINARY MEETING.

WEDNESDAY, 1st MAY, 1889.

Number of members present, 71.

## Private Business.

The vice-president, Rev. J. POLACK, B.A., in the chair.

The minutes of the last meeting were read and confirmed.

The resignations of Messrs. A. B. Holmes and Robert Martin were announced and accepted.

It was moved by Mr. Glynn Whittle, M.A., M.D., seconded by Mr. F. J. Leslie, F.R.G.S., and carried, "That the Annual Dinner of the society be held, and that the arrangements be left to the council.

The treasurer presented his annual statement of accounts, shewing a balance to the credit of the society of £163, in addition to the Dock Bond for £200.

The vice-president nominated Mr. F. J. Leslie to assist the honorary secretary in auditing the accounts.

Under the operation of Law X, the treasurer read out the following names :—P. G. Apalyras and H. Darracott.

The ballot on the nominations given in at the last meeting for the several offices for the next session, and for the six annual vacancies in the council took place, and was announced from the chair as follows :—

President - - Mr. George X. Segar, B.A.

Vice-President - - " Albert E. Isaac.

Treasurer - - " Henry Smith.

Hon. Secretary - - " W. Forshaw Wilson.

Six members of the council—Messrs. J. W. Alsop, B.A., E. M. Hance, LL.B., A. M. Jackson, Frank John Leslie, F.R.G.S., Joseph Polack, B.A., and Thomas Snape.

The following donation to the library of the society was acknowledged:—"Thirty-sixth Annual Report of the Committee of the Free Public Library, Museum, and Walker Art Gallery of the City of Liverpool."

#### General Business.

The session was closed by an address from the vice-president, Rev. Joseph Polack, B.A., after which it was proposed by the president, J. W. Alsop, B.A.:—"That the best thanks of the society be accorded to the vice-president for his address, and that with his consent it be printed in the volume of Proceedings of the society."

The motion was seconded by R. John Lloyd, M.A., supported by Messrs. R. J. Powell, Frederick Broadbridge, A. M. Jackson, Fred. Wevill, and carried.

The vice-president acceded to the request of the society.

(The vice-president's address will be found at page lxi of the Appendix.)



**REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT**  
**AND THE**  
**SWISS "REFERENDUM."**

**BY**  
**J. W. ALSOP, B.A.,**  
**PRESIDENT.**



## REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT AND THE SWISS "REFERENDUM."

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THE late Sir Henry Maine, in the Four Essays published shortly before his death under the title of *Popular Government*, quitted the field of historical and ethnological research in which he was without a rival, and entered that of political discussion. It need hardly be added that he carried with him the ripe knowledge, the insight, the accuracy, the clear and vigorous style, which characterize all his works. When, therefore, in trenchant language he described some of the difficulties which attend the democratic form of government, he earned the gratitude both of its friends and of its foes. A timid politician might, indeed, have been alarmed by the array of facts by which Sir Henry Maine showed the extreme instability which has hitherto attended popular government in some countries; in France, for example, where, since 1789, the government has been overthrown three times by the mob of Paris, three times by the army, and three times by foreign invasion; in Spain, which has undergone a still greater number of revolutions within the same period; even more, in the various Spanish-American communities. And if the reader were reassured by the thought that no such examples were drawn from countries of Teutonic race, his spirits would fall with the gloomy forebodings respecting the British constitution which conclude the essay on "The Nature of Democracy":—

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"We are drifting towards a type of government associated with terrible events—a single Assembly armed with full powers over the Constitution, which it may exercise at pleasure. It will be a theoretically all-powerful Convention, governed by a practically all-powerful secret Committee of Public Safety, but kept from complete submission to its authority by Obstruction, for which its rulers are always seeking to find a remedy in some kind of moral guillotine."

It is only fair to Sir Henry Maine to add that he considers that these dire results could be avoided by establishing a broad distinction (such as exists in most constitutional countries, and has been the dream of more than one political thinker in ours) between the formalities attending ordinary legislation and the more deliberate process which should be required in the case of legislation effecting constitutional changes, and that he bestows almost unqualified praise upon the constitution of the United States, which was so long the *bête noire* of the opponents of democracy.

Sir Henry Maine's criticisms at least bring home to us very forcibly some of the great difficulties which attend popular government. These difficulties are greater than, and differ in kind from, those which characterise a Monarchy or an Aristocracy, and are the result of the higher and more complex organisation of the sovereign power. They bear the same relation to those of monarchy as the laws of human society bear to the laws regulating a single life. They point to the importance of the machinery, the methods, of democracy; and I have thought it may not be uninteresting to devote a little time this evening to the consideration of some of the special difficulties of the democratic form of government, and of one or two of the methods by which it has been sought to overcome them.

It is needful in the first place to have a definite idea of the meaning of "Democracy" or "Popular Government."

The word "Democracy," says John Austin, the most exact of English writers on jurisprudence, "signifies properly a form of government, that is, any government in which the governing body is a comparatively large fraction of the entire nation." Sir Henry Maine quotes this definition with approval and expands it thus:—"It is the government of the State by the Many, as opposed, according to the old Greek analysis, to its government by the Few, and to its government by One. The border between the Few and the Many, and again between the varieties of the Many, is necessarily indeterminate; but Democracy not the less remains a mere form of government; and inasmuch as of these forms the most definite and determinate is Monarchy—the government of the State by one person—Democracy is most accurately described as inverted Monarchy." While in a monarchy the will of one governs the acts of many, in a democracy the combined or aggregate will of many governs the acts of each one. No fault can be found with these definitions, but they need to be supplemented by the statement that a democracy is more or less complete, or (in other words) a state is more or less democratic, according as a greater or smaller proportion of the citizens share in the government, and also according to the frequency and importance of the occasions upon which they habitually exercise their power. For example, a democracy which habitually handed over large executive powers to an individual for life would in this view be a less complete democracy than one which delegated such powers to a number of persons or for a short term only. On the same principle a state which, like Switzerland, reserves to its citizens a veto upon laws passed by the representatives of those citizens would be a more complete democracy than one which, like France, reserves no such veto.

That a democracy is ideally the best form of government,

where the people are willing and able to receive and preserve it and to fulfil its duties, is now a generally accepted doctrine. It is, however, worth while to recall the two principal arguments by which this doctrine was established by Mr. J. S. Mill in his *Representative Government*, especially as one of them is only grudgingly accepted by Sir Henry Maine, and the other is unaccountably ignored by him. The first and principal argument is that where, under the conditions just stated, the supreme controlling power is vested in the entire aggregate, or at all events in a relatively large number of the citizens, the good management of its affairs as a whole will be better promoted than by any other form of government, because, speaking generally, each person is the only safe guardian of his own rights and interests, and each is also the best judge of what those rights and interests are. Those persons who in any community are excluded from political power are liable to obtain less than their due, for those who have the power will naturally be both less anxious and less competent to provide for their wants than they themselves would be. Now the welfare of the state as a whole is made up of the welfare of its component parts. If then any section of the citizens obtains less than its due the total welfare is diminished. It therefore follows that, with the qualifications above mentioned, the good management of public affairs, or, in other words, the preservation of the rights and interests of all the citizens, will be best advanced by a democracy.

The second argument in favour of a democracy—the one which Sir Henry Maine wholly ignores—is also an important one. It rests upon the influence of this form of government upon the character of those who take part in it. Human beings, even when they form part of the machinery of government, are never mere machines. The printing press, the electric wire, remain unchanged though they are

the media by which thought and emotion are transmitted : but citizens who have any, even a small share in the affairs of their country, cannot but be influenced in character by that participation. Now in a democracy the citizens are compelled to think, to choose, to act : the active, energetic side of their nature is stimulated : a sense of responsibility is developed : in a word, they become, in a particular class of subjects, and to a certain degree, "educated." The faculties which under a monarchy or an aristocracy would have lain dormant, or even have been repressed, are encouraged to action. Thus democracy tends to promote a higher type of character in its citizens ; and as the manner in which public affairs are managed depends above all things upon the moral and mental qualities of those who manage them, it follows that a democracy, where the citizens are fitted for it, tends indirectly, as well as directly, to promote the best interests of the state.

But, though ideally the best, democracy is an extremely difficult form of government, and its difficulties appear when one comes to examine its practical working. Every government depends, in the last resort, upon the *will* of the sovereign power, whether consisting of one person or of many. Now, in a monarchy there is a single will, easily ascertained, easily expressed, easily enforced ; the sovereign retains under his control just as many of the functions of government—judicial, executive, legislative—as he may choose ; he delegates to other persons or bodies of persons such functions as he thinks proper, and revokes the delegation at pleasure. He is the fountain from which all action springs, the centre from which all power radiates. If he is wise and just, and selects subordinates who are wise and just, his rule will be rightly called a benevolent despotism, and will be admirably suited to nations whose civilisation is not yet highly developed. The conditions

of monarchical government are therefore comparatively simple.

In a democracy, these conditions are reversed. It is only in a figurative sense that a large body of persons can be said to have a single will. In practical life it is found that, from one cause or another, differences of opinion always exist among the members of such a body upon every important subject. Even where there is a general agreement in principle, differences in detail will be present; the simplest act will rarely find unanimous approval, and it will be difficult to frame a proposition that will command the assent of a large number. Every democracy would therefore be paralysed and speedily brought to a deadlock, were the unanimity of the governing body required for the exercise of any of its functions. Accordingly, in all democratic communities this state of things has been avoided by adopting, tacitly or avowedly, the useful convention that where a command, a law, or a decision, can be so expressed as to obtain the assent of a majority of the citizens, or a majority of any specified body of them, it is to be regarded and acted upon as if it had obtained the assent of all the citizens, or of all the members of the specified body. Popular government is in practice the government of a majority. Every member of a democratic community possesses a small fragment of political power, but by this convention it may be of no more direct advantage to him than if he had none; for it is possible that upon every political question which arises he may be in the minority.

The convention that government in a democracy means government by the majority of those who possess political power leads to important consequences. It renders it necessary to provide some machinery by which the will of the majority can be ascertained, and we are at once plunged into a sea of problems concerning the suffrage, electoral

areas, modes and occasions of voting, and so forth. Many political questions, again, are of such a nature that they are not capable of being determined once for all, but may be decided in opposite senses at different times; for example, a law may be passed, and afterwards modified or repealed; a policy may be adopted, and then reversed. A minority which holds its opinion strongly will, with this possibility before it, naturally seek to become a majority by convincing a sufficient number of those who hold the opposite opinion. This is, indeed, the privilege of a minority in a democratic state, and the mark which distinguishes its condition from that of the subjects of a despotism. It is the troubling of the political waters which keeps them sweet and wholesome; and a democracy in which a convinced minority made no effort to become a majority would be in a fair way to prove its unfitness to regulate its own destiny. But we are brought to the verge of new difficulties when we come to consider *how* a minority is to be changed into a majority, what methods of influencing opinion are to be encouraged, what methods to be forbidden, how far individuals should be permitted to form combinations or "parties" for the propagation of their views, what amount of obedience these combinations may properly exact from their members, by what sanctions they may enforce that obedience; all these are problems of which a despotism knows nothing, but with which a democracy is bound to concern itself under penalty of forfeiting its right to exist. Then, again, the tremendous and irreparable consequences which may in some cases flow from the decision of a bare majority in a democracy—a decision which may be thoughtlessly or accidentally arrived at—naturally suggest that some method should, in a democratic constitution, be devised of distinguishing between deliberate and hasty decisions. This is the origin of the various systems of *checks* by which it is

sought to secure the careful consideration of important issues. At first sight, checks may seem inconsistent with the principle of democracy, but experience has shewn that they are essential to the permanence of popular government. The "all-powerful convention" which Sir Henry Maine dreaded so much, has at times been found a necessary expedient for temporary purposes, but where it has been adopted as a permanent institution it has invariably led to disaster. On the other hand, the constitution of the United States of America, which has a more elaborate system of checks than any other which I know of, has for a century been in thorough harmony with the wishes of its citizens, while itself undergoing comparatively little change. There are many kinds of checks—a second chamber, a permanent or suspensory veto, a distinction between the formalities necessary for the more important and the less important acts of sovereignty; all these tend to the same end—that of securing deliberation on the part of the democracy—and they cannot, when examined, be said to be contrary to its principle.

Every democracy will have to deal with the problems which I have mentioned. There are other difficulties which may be called physical, which will also exist, except in a very small state. There have been democracies, both in the ancient world and in modern times, in which the citizens have been so few that they could themselves exercise most of the functions of government; but even in the smallest, I believe, certain functions were delegated by the general body to a smaller number, who were ascertained by choice or by lot, and whose powers were granted for longer or shorter periods. And in the larger democratic states there has necessarily been a highly developed system of devolution of many of the functions of government to single persons, or bodies of persons. In a large state, the work which a government has to get through is, in amount, utterly beyond

the powers of the citizens to manage; much of it is complex and difficult, and such as a few can conduct more effectively than a large number; the multitude have neither the time nor the knowledge which would enable them to do it properly; they are at best amateurs, and for some of the functions of government highly trained experts are needed. If, in such a case, the citizens attempt to do the work themselves, they will probably do it badly. They will best shew their adherence to the principle of democracy by *controlling* the work of government, rather than by endeavouring to perform it. Accordingly, in modern democracies, the functions of government have usually been entrusted to a comparatively small number of persons, the larger body retaining a certain control, by the establishment of the system known as Representative Government.

It is a curious fact that such a system was unknown to the ancient democracies, and there are few indications of it among the democracies of the middle ages, except in this country, where it may be said to have originated. In modern times it has become so widely spread that we are apt to regard popular government and representative government as almost convertible terms, which they certainly are not. Mr. J. S. Mill, for instance, in his work on *Representative Government*, does not attempt to prove, but takes it for granted, that representative government is identical with popular government. After shewing, by the convincing arguments to which I have referred, that a democracy is ideally the best form of government, he says: "But since all cannot, in a community exceeding a single small town, participate personally in any but some very minor portions of the public business, it follows that the ideal type of a perfect government must be representative." For my own part, while appreciating the many advantages of the representative system, I think the term "ideal" cannot appropriately be

applied to it, and, at all events, our examination will not be so candid if we assume at starting that it is necessarily an ideal or final type.

There has been much controversy as to the true meaning of the word "Representative" when used as a political term, and some confusion has arisen from the fact that it is used in two very different senses in political discussions. Dr. Johnson defines "representation" as "the act of supporting a vicarious character;" and "vicarious" is found to mean "deputed: delegated: acting in the place of another." A political representative is therefore a person who acts politically on behalf of another person or body of persons by reason of his having been appointed by him or them so to do. The two factors which give a man the position of a representative are—first, that he should be appointed by the body for whom he acts; and, secondly, that he should act instead of them and on their behalf. Using the word in this broad sense, we speak of an Ambassador as the representative of his country, of an American Senator as the representative of his state, of an English Member of Parliament as the representative of his constituency.

But when we look into the matter more closely we find important varieties in the relation which may exist between the representative and the represented. Take the cases of the first and third of the examples just given. An ambassador is appointed and removed at pleasure by the government of the country which he represents: he acts on behalf of his country but strictly in accordance with the instructions he receives from the home government; he carries out not the policy which he thinks best, but the policy which they think best; he refers new questions to them, and acts as they direct. An English member of Parliament stands in a very different position as regards his constituents: they appoint him, and he acts on their behalf: but they cannot

dismiss him, and unless he dies or resigns, he will continue to act on their behalf, whether they like it or not, until the House of Commons itself is dissolved. Moreover, they cannot give him instructions as to his acts, or, if they do, he is not legally bound to act upon them. He has, doubtless, expressed certain opinions and perhaps given pledges before his election, but he is not bound to adhere to his opinions or, except by his conscience, to redeem his pledges : at all events, there is no method of legally compelling him to do either. There are, therefore, two very different modes of political representation, and it is unfortunate that there are not two recognised terms to express the distinction : both are indiscriminately called representation and thus a confused meaning becomes attached to the term. For the sake of clearness I propose to use the word "Delegate" for the first kind of representatives, the mere agents who are removable at pleasure, and who act upon express instructions ; and to limit the word "Representative" to persons who are irremovable, and also, if agents, are at least free agents, exercising their own judgment and not following definite instructions.

In modern democratic countries the most important functions of government are vested in, or at least controlled by, an assembly or assemblies of representatives rather than of delegates. The representatives are chosen on behalf of sections of the people which are determined by geographical position ; this arrangement is practically a convenient one, and in a rough and ready way it tends to produce an assembly which reflects the various desires of the various portions of a country. It would, however, be possible to constitute a representative body upon other lines, according to the occupations of the citizens for example, so that each trade or profession should have its allotted number of representatives. And ingenious schemes have been contrived,

though not as yet put into practice, by which persons who hold substantially the same opinions upon any important subject, in whatever part of the state they may dwell, should have the means of forming, so to speak, an automatic constituency with power to appoint a number of representatives proportionate to their own number. The advantage claimed for such a scheme is that it would tend, more than any other, to make the assembly more thoroughly representative—a microcosm of the nation in fact—because each constituency thus formed would be likely to choose representatives of its own opinions. It seems to me, however, that under such a scheme the person chosen would lose many of the privileges enjoyed by a representative, while the constituency would fail to obtain in recompence the advantages which they might have under a system of delegation.

There are, however, assemblies, such as the Bundesrath appointed by the individual states constituting the German Empire, which are practically, if not in name, assemblies of delegates. And in former times an assembly of delegates was by no means uncommon. The deputies to the States-General of the United Provinces of the Netherlands were mere delegates, who met together and discussed questions of national concern, but acted each upon the instructions given him by his own province. The English House of Commons was itself originally an assembly of delegates. Each constituency elected annually two of its own inhabitants, who went to Westminster armed with explicit instructions how to act: the Parliamentary session lasted only a few weeks, and was chiefly occupied with the granting of supplies to the Crown and the endeavour to obtain redress of local grievances: when it was over the members returned to their homes, reported what they had done, and were *functi officio*. They received payment for their services, and were to all intents the servants or agents of their constituencies.

How a number of causes, especially the passing of the Septennial Act, have gradually changed the Member of Parliament from the Delegate to the Representative is traced in the interesting work on *Representative Government in England*, written some years ago by Mr. David Syme, who advocates some sweeping alterations in our political system with the object of reverting to the old and, as Mr. Syme thinks, the better system of delegation.

It has often been said that a system of delegation is more completely democratic than a system of representation, and 'this view is at least plausible. If a member were removable by his constituents at pleasure, if he were obliged to consult them before each vote and to cast his vote according to their opinions and not according to his own, the citizens would certainly have a larger share in political functions than they have at present, and their immediate wishes would be more likely to have effect given to them. But such a system carried out in detail would break down by its own weight, the citizens would be met by those very practical difficulties in forming their decisions and instructing the delegate to carry them out which, as we have seen, must exist wherever citizens attempt to conduct the business of government themselves. At most, the citizens could only give their instructions upon the more important subjects, and these are just the subjects upon which it is desirable that the delegate should heartily hold the same opinions as the majority of his constituents, and should not be the mere mouthpiece for opinions not shared by himself.

But, from the democratic point of view, there is a stronger objection than this to the substitution of delegation for representation. I have already quoted Mr. J. S. Mill's argument in favour of popular government, which is based upon its effect upon the character of the people themselves. The argument holds good when applied to an assembly just

as when applied to the entire body of citizens. The member who has to take daily or weekly instructions from constituents probably less well-informed on political matters than himself, will be tempted to subordinate or even to conceal his opinions, will cease to care to form right opinions, will lose, in fact, the sense of responsibility which is so important an element in the character of a ruler. And if the individual members of the assembly lose the sense of responsibility, if the work they appear to do is not theirs in reality, but is done at the dictation of others, the pride, the dignity, the self-respect of the assembly as a whole cannot be maintained, it will have abdicated its best functions, and will cease to be a worthy exponent even of the passing desires of the people. An assembly of delegates entrusted with important powers would have in its constitution the seeds of decay, and would tend to degrade rather than uphold the popular form of government.

It has, however, been objected to the representative system of government that it is not a democratic system at all. Sir George Cornewall Lewis used to say that the government of the United States, for example, was improperly described as a democracy, and that it was in reality an aristocracy. His argument was that the supreme power in the Union is vested not in the people, but in representative assemblies chosen by the people. He pointed out that a right of voting, though doubtless a political right, is distinct from sovereignty; that the power to vote for the election of a member of a sovereign representative assembly is one thing, and the power of such a member when elected is quite another. The people, the Many, elect the representatives, but the representatives, the Few, exercise sovereign power; and the rule of the Few is properly an aristocracy. But let us see what the great historian of Democracy in America, De Tocqueville, says on this point:—

"In America, the people appoints the legislative and the executive power, and furnishes the jurors, who punish all offences against the laws. The American institutions are democratic, not only in their principle but in their consequences; and the people elects its representatives *directly* and for the most part *annually*, in order to insure their dependence. The people is therefore the real directing power; and although the form of government is representative, it is evident that the opinions, the prejudices, the interests, and even the passions of the community are hindered by no durable obstacles from exercising a perpetual influence on society. In the United States the majority governs in the name of the people, as is the case in all the countries in which the people is supreme."

Surely De Tocqueville's view is the true one. A monarch who should appoint a provincial governor for a term of five years would not cease to be a monarch. A democracy which entrusts certain executive powers to a president for four years does not cease to be a democracy. Nor does it lose its popular character by entrusting certain legislative powers to representatives chosen for two years.

In forming an opinion as to the popular character of an assembly of representatives, the really important points to consider are its mode of election, its duration, its powers; upon these matters will it depend whether it is a more or less completely democratic institution. If we apply these tests to the present French Senate, whose members are chosen for nine years, one third retiring every third year, and whose constituents are very narrow electoral bodies, we see at once that it is an assembly of the *less* completely democratic order. The French Chamber of Deputies, on the other hand, elected by manhood suffrage for four years, and with all its members retiring simultaneously, is a much more completely democratic body. The English House of Commons, as a democratic body, lies between the French Senate and the French Chamber of Deputies. It is less completely democratic than the French Chamber, not only because its suffrage

is narrower, but because it may legally run to a term of seven years, though in modern times its average duration has been only about four years.

We have seen that under a system of representation the member of an assembly when once elected is for a defined period beyond the legal control of his constituency ; he is at liberty to act for them as he thinks right, and not as they may direct. They have no machinery by which to convey instructions to him ; if they had, and if he were bound to follow their instructions, he would become a delegate instead of a representative. The independence of a representative is, however, qualified in actual practice by the usage by which in all democratic countries the constituency before election requires a candidate to state his opinions upon important subjects, and sometimes exacts from him pledges as to his action in certain contingencies. Of course when a candidate gives pledges he is morally bound to fulfil them or to resign his seat. In general this is found a sufficient security that the conduct of a representative will be in conformity with the wishes of the majority of his constituents as regards questions which are present to the minds of the representative and his constituents at the time of his election. No such security exists as regards new questions which may arise during the representative's tenure of office : as a rule there is no constitutional way of even ascertaining the wishes of a body of electors upon new questions without a fresh election, and the representative is therefore morally as well as legally left to act as he considers right with regard to them. It may thus easily happen that upon such questions a representative may, while acting to the best of his judgment, act contrary to the wishes of the majority of his constituents.

This, from a democratic point of view, is the weak point of the representative system—the disadvantage which has to be set against the enormous advantages flowing from the

existence of a strong and responsible assembly which would seem unattainable under a system of delegation.

The disadvantage, of course, becomes less if the duration of an assembly is shortened. The representative is then brought more frequently face to face with his constituents, there are fewer opportunities for divergence between his opinions and theirs; if a divergence should disclose itself, they have the power to elect some one in his place after a comparatively short interval. When a member is elected for a single session of only a few weeks, as in the early English parliament, he can in practice be little more than a delegate, even though he may not be fettered by express directions as to his actions. But, on the other hand, assemblies which exist for very short periods want that continuity of life which is necessary for real power: they have hardly learned to use their strength before they come to what naturally seems to them an untimely end: consequently they are weak and, like weak men, are apt to be in turn rash and vacillating. Very short-lived assemblies are by no means favourable to the permanence of a democratic form of government.

It is thus clear that the shortening of the duration of an assembly is not an adequate remedy for the evils which must at times result from want of harmony between representatives and their constituents. Modern constitution-makers, recognising the disadvantages of the present system, have invented another mode of removing them—a mode which is now on its trial in Switzerland, and, I believe, in one or two of the Western States of America.

This plan consists in giving in certain cases a right of appeal from the decision of the representatives to the constituencies themselves. In the Swiss "Referendum" this right of final appeal has existed for several years, and, as it is an experiment of the highest political interest and is

perhaps not very widely understood in this country, I will venture to give some account of it.

The "Referendum" is an adaptation of the "plébiscite," a name which in its modern political application dates from its first use in 1793, when the constitution of the first French Republic was submitted to the people and adopted by a mass vote. Since that time the plébiscite has been little more than a convenient cloak under which absolutism has thought it decent to conceal its sinister designs. The First Napoleon saw its adaptability to this end, but it was reserved to the Second Empire to bring the "plébiscite" to ultimate perfection as an apology for despotism.

Happily, there are also opportunities of studying what may be called the *bonâ fide* working of the mass-vote in countries where it is used with the object of ascertaining the real wishes of the people. In most of the States constituting the American Union, the chief executive officers, and in some cases the judges also, are elected by direct popular vote. Whatever objections may exist to the election of judges by this process, there seem none to such a mode of electing executive officers, and in fact the system has worked well in the United States. The founders of the Federal constitution intended that the President of the republic should not be chosen in this way, but by a system of double election, the states appointing members of an Electoral College which, by an independent exercise of judgment, would select the candidate whom its members might think most suitable. But in practice, as we all know, the members of the Electoral College are delegates, not representatives; the President is elected by the popular vote, given, however, through the States in a mode resembling the French "*Scrutin de Liste*."

In the United States, however, the citizens cannot be said to exercise directly the functions of government; they

elect the judges and executive officers, as well as the members of the legislative body, but they have no direct voice in making the laws. In Switzerland, on the other hand, by virtue of the "Referendum," they exercise a direct control over legislation, both in the central government and in nearly all the cantons.

Switzerland as a country, instead of a mere confederation of allied states, dates from the year 1848. In that year the cantons adopted a Federal constitution, and established a central legislature and executive. At the same time they retained their old constitutions, except as regards the powers which they surrendered to the central Federal authority. Most of them were democracies of a more or less complete type. Several of them were so small in area and population that their citizens had been accustomed to exercise, and even now exercise, some of the functions of government without the intervention of representative bodies, all male citizens of full age assembling together in the open air at stated periods, making laws, and appointing their administrators. These assemblies, called "Landesgemeinden," are still held in at least four cantons—Appenzell, Glarus, Unterwälden and Uri. Citizens who were accustomed to a direct participation in the acts of government were naturally indisposed to delegate, without power of recall, large powers to a new and untried assembly. The constitution of 1848, therefore, contained a provision for its revision at any time, either on the initiative of the Federal Assembly, or upon a request made in writing by fifty thousand citizens. The constitution worked satisfactorily, and was not revised for many years. In the meantime, the constitutions of most of the cantons came to be revised in a democratic sense, and, as their growth in population tended to throw the "Landesgemeinden" into disuse, a substitute was frequently adopted in the "Referendum," or direct

appeal to the people, which now, I believe, forms part of the constitution of every canton except Freiburg. There are two kinds of "Referendum." Where the obligatory form exists, every new law, after it has passed the legislative assembly, must be submitted to direct popular vote before it comes into force. Where the "Referendum" is "facultative" or optional, a new law need only be submitted if so required by a prescribed number of citizens.

A proposal to revise the Federal constitution in various particulars, but on the whole with a tendency towards strengthening the Federal government, was submitted to a "plébiscite" in 1872, but was lost by a small majority. In 1874 a fresh proposal was brought forward, and, being less sweeping in its changes, was carried by 287,000 votes against 122,000, and by fifteen cantons against eight. The new constitution, which is still in force, extends the "Referendum" to ordinary Federal legislation by enacting that, where 80,000 electors send in a written request to that effect, any law or resolution which has passed the Federal Assembly must be submitted to the people, who may either accept or reject it. The revision of the new constitution is regulated by the same conditions as the old one.

One or two instances will shew the actual working of the "Referendum" under the Federal constitution. The constitution of 1874 contained a provision by which capital punishment was abolished throughout the republic. Subsequent discussion revealed great differences of opinion as to the expediency of the abolition, and it appeared that opposite views upon the subject prevailed in different cantons. In 1878, the State-Council, which consists of forty-four members, two chosen by each canton, decided by twenty-seven votes to seventeen that it was desirable to amend the constitution by giving each canton the right to re-establish capital punishment if it thought fit. Thereupon the question was

submitted to the popular vote, with the result that the amendment was adopted by a majority of fifteen thousand votes. It is clear that many voted for the amendment, not because they desired the re-establishment of capital punishment, but because they considered that the question was one of cantonal rather than of national concern, for during several years after the passing of the amendment not one canton availed itself of the privilege of reimposing the penalty of death, and I believe that only two cantons have ever done so.

In another important matter, on the other hand, the power of the Federal government has been strengthened since 1874. The constitution had left the regulation of the liquor-traffic to each canton. But in 1885, the need of more complete and uniform control led to a proposal that this matter should be placed under the jurisdiction of the Federal government, and an amendment of the constitution for effecting this change was carried upon a "plébiscite" by 225,000 votes against 153,000. Two years later, the Federal Assembly, in pursuance of its new power, framed a law dealing with the liquor traffic, which was itself the subject of a "Referendum," and was thereupon adopted by 252,000 votes against 127,000.

Sir Henry Maine has made more than one reference to this feature of Swiss politics in the *Essays on Popular Government*, and he evidently viewed it with extreme suspicion. He spoke of it as an institution which was "likely to tempt democracies into dispensing with prudent and independent direction." But he has himself elsewhere said that the actual results of the "plébiscite" in Switzerland have been that "laws of the highest importance, some of them openly framed for popularity, have been vetoed by the people, after they had been adopted by the Federal or Cantonal Legislature."

Although these are contrary propositions, I do not think that either of them is borne out by the facts. As regards the second, I think it will be found on examining the laws which have been rejected by the Swiss people since 1874, that in most cases they were rejected on the ground that they related to matters which the citizens considered ought to be dealt with by the cantons and not by the Federal Assembly. In point of fact, during the thirteen years between 1874 and 1886, 107 federal laws and resolutions passed that assembly: of these nineteen were by the operation of the "Referendum" submitted to popular vote, out of which thirteen were rejected and six were accepted. As regards Sir Henry Maine's dread that the "Referendum" "may tempt democracies into dispensing with prudent and independent direction," it seems sufficient to point out that, as embodied in the Swiss constitution, it is not an instrument for effecting violent change, but a security against it: it does not enable a law to be passed by "plébiscite" against the judgment of an educated body of representatives, it merely gives the people a veto, and is in fact a constitutional check upon the action of the representative body. Sir Henry Maine mentions as a remarkable fact that, under a cantonal "Referendum," a law establishing a progressive income tax was negatived: does not this result shew that in one canton at least the people were wiser than their representatives?

The point which strikes one as the weakest in the Swiss "Referendum" is that the safeguards against a constitutional change are less strong than those against a change in ordinary legislation. The people can in the former case take the initiative and carry through the constitutional change by a popular vote, though both houses which form the Federal Assembly are opposed to it. But I understand that besides the popular vote, the assent of a majority of the cantons is also required in such case, and this may be

regarded as an important additional check upon hasty changes.

It is possible that the "Referendum" has a considerable future before it in democratic states, and though it would be rash to draw broad conclusions from the Swiss experiment, it must be admitted that as a mode of controlling the action of representative bodies it deserves careful consideration. Certainly if it is desirable that the citizens should have some opportunity of saying "yea" or "nay" to a legislative change, the stage chosen is the only appropriate one: it is only when the details have been elaborated and fully discovered by experts in a legislative assembly that the exact working of a proposed change can be gauged: before that stage is reached its advantages may be discerned, but not its difficulties. Nor can I agree with those who think that the popular veto would tend to make a legislative assembly act with less care: surely greater care would be bestowed upon the details at all events, if they were liable to be submitted to a body of citizens who, if the details were unsatisfactory, would reject the whole measure. Such a system would also be likely to cause measures which had once passed the legislative assembly to be considered on their intrinsic merits rather than in connection with the parties or persons who advocated or opposed them. And it would allow the direct expression of the national will upon the less important legislative proposals, upon which there is now in most communities no method by which that will can be ascertained.


But it is no part of my design this evening to advocate this or that political machine: my object has rather been to draw attention to the working difficulties of democracy, especially in connection with the modern representative system, and to point out the importance of discovering the best machinery for overcoming those working difficulties.

George Sand has said that the ideal life is none other than man's normal life as we shall some day know it. Men of such different temperaments and training as John Stuart Mill and Matthew Arnold, meet on the common ground that the ideal political life is that of the citizen of a democratic state. How best to make that ideal political life man's normal political life is the problem of modern political philosophy.

**RHETORIC.**

**BY**

**RICHARD STEEL.**



## RHETORIC.

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ARISTOTLE in his *Sophist* stated, according to Diogenes Laertius, that Empedocles of Agrigentum was the first person who invented Rhetoric. But whilst no one would seek to detract from the fame of this "honeyed speaker of soft forensic speeches,"\* who perished in the crater of Mount Etna, it is certain on the one hand that the original practice of the arts of argumentative composition and persuasive speaking must have been coeval with the use of language; and on the other, that Aristotle himself was the first writer whose views upon the subject of Rhetoric have obtained any wide and general currency. Socrates had indeed been "clever in rhetorical exercises,"† and, according to Phalarinus, was the first man who, in conjunction with his disciple, Æschines,‡ taught men how to become orators; but the teachings of Socrates appear to have been entirely oral, and the speeches of Æschines had the evil reputation possessed by those of some modern orators of not convincing any one.§ And as the effective claims to skill and reputation put forward on behalf of any other rhetoricians before Aristotle are also questionable on various grounds, we are tolerably safe in attributing to the great leader of the Peripatetic school, the first systematic foundation of that art of Rhetoric with some aspects of which my paper to-night has to deal.

Not only then must Aristotle be regarded as the first

\* Diogenes Laertius's *Life of Empedocles*.

† Diogenes Laertius's *Life of Socrates*.

‡ Not to be confounded with Æschines, the contemporary of Demosthenes, who flourished about a century later.

§ This, according to Timon; see Diogenes Laertius's *Life of Æschines*.

systematic expounder of this art of Rhetoric in point of date, but he has ever since stood quite in the first rank as the greatest and most able writer upon the subject. It was, indeed, if we are to believe that faithful biographer, Diogenes Laertius, largely dealt with and handled by many other ancient philosophers; as, for example, by Chrysippus the Stoic, who, from his choice of Philomathes as the dedicatee of several of his works, is certainly entitled to special mention when addressing a Society which inherits in some sort the name of this favoured disciple. But the voluminous works of this prolific writer are lost, and perhaps may not have possessed the inherent merit which is requisite to secure immortality to literary work. Many other ingenious ancients carried the art of disputation, as such, to a high degree of elaboration, if not of refinement, as is evident from the fact of their discriminating from each other many varieties of argument, such as the *veiled one*, the *mowing one*, the *horned one*, and so forth, the differences between which rested upon fine distinctions, which are now barely intelligible. But these subtleties, as well as those of which Suetonius gives us an illustration in his *Lives of Eminent Rhetoricians*, were logical, rather than rhetorical, in their nature, and the only really important survivals, germane to our present subject, which have come down to us from the classic days of Greece and Rome, besides Aristotle's great work, belong to the period of Cicero and Quintilian, one of whom mixed up general education with rhetoric to so great an extent as to obscure, except to the laborious and conscientious reader, the real rhetorical value of a certain portion of his matter, and the other of whom produced an extremely eloquent treatise upon Oratory, which is almost entirely destitute of any practical rhetorical instruction whatever.

So true indeed is it that any work done in the systema-

tization of Rhetoric during the centuries which succeeded Aristotle was inferior to his own, that, whilst we may regard the foundation of the art as having been well and truly laid by him, we may, without losing many points of practical value upon the subject, overleap the gulf of time which yawns between these past ages and our own; for it is not until the present century that we find an able and acute writer again taking up the subject at the point at which Aristotle left it, and dealing with it in the main upon similar and parallel lines; that writer, to whom I now refer, is, as you will at once surmise, Archbishop Whately.

Whately's "Rhetoric" was published in substance about the year 1816, as a contribution to the *Encyclopædia Metropolitana*; appeared in its present expanded form as a separate work in 1828, and has ever since remained the standard authority upon a subject upon which few English authors have written, and upon which none have written so well. And if in the remainder of my paper I may appear to deal with his treatise from the critical point of view, it is not from any want of admiring appreciation of that remarkable book. No student of Rhetoric can possibly do better than study its pages, and he will find in them, not only the best practical precepts extant upon the subject, but will also derive abundant pleasure and instruction, from the lucid style and well arranged matter, by means of which the rhetorical skill of their author is illustrated as well as displayed.

Whately deals with Rhetoric then, as already stated, much in the same manner as does Aristotle; it is according to them both the art of argumentative composition and persuasive speaking. He successfully vindicates Rhetoric from the reflection upon it, implied in these current ideas, which

associate it with dishonest artifice; and as successfully shews that it has a really valuable and important sphere in shaping those verbal instruments which have the conviction and instruction of the human mind for their object. Although the use of ornamental and figurative language falls within its scope, yet it is not to be identified with language of this particular sort, as, for example, was done by Butler in his *Hudibras*, in the following well known lines :—

“For Rhetoric, he could not ope  
“His mouth but out there flew a trope.”

He does not indeed undervalue ornament, where it can judiciously be used, but agrees in substance with the finely expressed dictum of Quintilian :—

“Brilliant thoughts are, I consider, as it were the the eyes of eloquence; but I would not that the body were all eyes, lest the “other members should lose their proper functions.”

And he is not unaware of the dangerous influence which the habitual use of figurative language may have upon the mental processes of those who indulge in it too largely, and which was thus ingeniously illustrated by Hume :—

“Men of bright fancies may, in this respect, be compared to those “angels whom the Scripture represents as covering their eyes with “their wings.”\*

Whilst Whately, then, vindicates throughout his book the importance and intrinsic value of a sound Rhetoric, he deals analytically with the art under the separate heads of Arguments, Persuasion, Style, and Delivery, † with regard to

\* *Treatise on Human Nature.*

† This classification was probably originally derived from the Stoics. See *Life of Zeno.*

each of which I shall follow in his footsteps, indicating rather these few points in which I venture to dissent from his great authority, than those much more numerous ones in which the soundness and excellence of the ideas which he propounds are beyond challenge, and the full enjoyment of which I leave you to earn for yourselves by a perusal or reperusal, as the case may be, of his book.

As is only fitting then, we take the subject of Arguments first. Whately agrees with Aristotle, that Rhetoric is the handmaid of Logic, but he discerned far more clearly than the Stagirite the natural boundary that lies between them. Rather than be confined, however, too closely to the true rhetorical territory, he does not hesitate, when occasion requires, to invade the neighbouring field of Logic, and is thus able, by a trifling latitude of treatment, to present his readers with an enumeration and classification of arguments which is most ingenious, and, at the same time, in the main, thoroughly scientific. To this, however, there is one important exception, and as, in addition to the dialectical interest *per se* of this exception, the illustrations which Whately happens to use in regard to it relate to matters which possess some present controversial interest, I shall make no apology for considering this apparent slip or error of our author somewhat fully.

Bear in mind then, in the first place, that the future Archbishop was a logician of the strictest sect of the logicians, that is to say, of the school of Aristotle, and that he placed the "*dictum de omni et nullo*" at the base of all valid reasoning, and then listen to a passage, which I shall presently quote. He has just spoken of the fact that several testimonies or signs (*σημεία*), singly perhaps of little weight, produce jointly, and by their coincidence, a degree of probability far exceeding the sum of their several forces

taken separately : which is evidently logical and true enough. It is logical, of course, because you can express the fact just stated as the conclusion of a valid syllogism following the laws of probability, the major premiss of which is virtually as follows :—" Those are the most probable hypotheses which serve to account for the greatest number of observed facts, and which are not inconsistent with any observed facts." But then he goes on to speak of the combined force which may result from a series of arguments from the *order* in which they are considered, and from their *progressive* tendency to establish a given conclusion, and he terms such a series collectively *the Argument from Progressive Approach*.

Had Whately here been treating of Fallacies, rather than of valid arguments, he could hardly have described more successfully, than he has done in the words I have quoted, one of the most dangerous of all fallacies to the thinker or reasoner. There is no more delusive trap to the mind than that which results from arranging facts in a certain order or system evolved out of the thinker's own consciousness, and then from that *order* and *sequence* which he himself has created deducing a conclusion which is the result of that particular order and arrangement. Such is, in fact, simply an elaborate form of *petitio principii*, or begging the question, and is the particular form of that fallacy in which the ablest minds are most apt to be involved. Let them have ever so slight a prepossession in favour of any conclusion, and straightway out of the vast storehouse of facts and fancies which their memories contain, a series starts up with which, as by stepping stones, they arrive at the very conclusion which best suits their prepossession, and they deceive themselves promptly into thinking that their demonstration is perfect, when they have in reality, like Milton's hellish pair, simply thrown a bridge without solid foundations over the abyss which lies between their premises and their conclusion.

From such *ex parte* arrangement of topics nothing can really be logically inferred. The moment you attempt to construct your major premiss out of such materials you utterly fail in your effort and see the impossibility of the task.

Take, for example, Whately's own three illustrations of this argument from progressive approach. The first of these is drawn from the laws of motion.

"One part of the law of nature called the *vis inertiae* is established by the argument alluded to; viz., that a body set in motion will eternally continue in motion with uniform velocity in a right line, so far as it is not acted upon by any causes which retard or stop, accelerate or divert, its course. Now as in every case which can come under our observation some such causes do intervene, the assumed supposition is practically impossible, and we have no opportunity of verifying the law by direct experiment; but we may gradually approach indefinitely near to the case supposed; and on the result of such experiments our conclusion is founded. We find that when a body is projected along a rough surface its motion is speedily retarded, and soon stopped; if along a smoother surface it continues longer in motion; if upon ice, longer still; and the like with regard to wheels, etc., in proportion as we gradually lessen the friction of the machinery; and if we remove the resistance of the air, by setting a wheel or pendulum in motion under an exhausted receiver, the motion is still longer continued. Finding then that the effect of the original impulse is more and more protracted, in proportion as we more and more remove the impediments to motion from friction and resistance of the air, we reasonably conclude, that if this could be completely done (which is out of our power), the motion would never cease, since what appear to be the only causes of its cessation, would be absent."

Now the conclusion here stated is no doubt correct enough. But we must not fall into the error of supposing that because the conclusion is correct that all trains of reasoning which profess to lead to it are necessarily sound. The conclusion which Whately assigns to Progressive Approach, as Progress-

sive Approach is defined by himself in the passage already quoted, is really dependent entirely for its logical validity upon a major premiss of which Whately says nothing. To convert the facts stated into a valid argument you must postulate a law of *absolute continuity* in physical cause and effect. Unless you do postulate this law it is evident that Whately's Progressive series of facts does not prove his conclusion, because, clearly, if there is *discontinuity*, the inference arrived at does not necessarily hold good. Even in this illustration then it is clear that Whately's argument is not logical *per se*, i.e., in virtue of his *progressive arrangement* of facts, but entirely in virtue of *another* statement which he does not make, and which they by no means necessarily imply.

The fallacy becomes, however, still more evident when we take the second of Whately's illustrations of his Argument. The argument in this case is for the being and attributes of the Deity, and I need hardly say that I am dealing with it only as Whately states it, and not at all from any really theological or controversial point of view. He says:—

"Nations of Atheists, if there are any such, are confessedly  
 "among the rudest and most ignorant savages; those who repre-  
 "sent their God or Gods as malevolent, capricious, or subject to  
 "human passions and vices, are invariably to be found (in the present  
 "day at least) among those who are brutal and uncivilized; and among  
 "the most civilized nations of the ancients, who professed a similar  
 "creed, the more enlightened members of society seem either to have  
 "rejected altogether, or to have explained away, the popular belief.  
 "The Mahometan nations again, of the present day, who are certainly  
 "more advanced in civilization than their Pagan neighbours, maintain  
 "the unity and the moral excellence of the Deity; but the nations of  
 "Christendom, whose notions of the Divine goodness are more exalted,  
 "are undeniably the most civilized part of the world, and possess,  
 "generally speaking, the most cultivated and improved intellectual  
 "powers. Now if we would ascertain and appeal to the sentiments of  
 "man as a rational being, we must surely look to those which not only

"prevail most among the most rational and cultivated, but towards which also a *progressive* tendency is found in men, in *proportion* to their degrees of rationality and cultivation. It would be most extravagant to suppose that man's advance towards a more improved and exalted state of existence should tend to obliterate true and instil false notions. On the contrary, we are authorised to conclude, that those notions would be the most correct which men would entertain whose knowledge, intelligence, and intellectual cultivation should have reached comparatively the highest pitch of perfection, and that those consequently will approach the nearest to the truth which are entertained, more or less, by various nations, in *proportion* as they have advanced towards this civilized state."

It is evident that here again, regarded as an argument, there is no true logical process whatever in the passage, taken as a whole, which I have just cited. No intelligible major premiss whatever can be framed to cover the facts alleged. The nearest to such would be the palpable *petitio principii* which would be involved in saying, "The most civilised people are always likely to be most correct in all their opinions; and we are the most civilised people,"—which is in effect to say that whatever *we* think is most likely to be right, a convenient major premiss, no doubt, and one in very general use, but one which supersedes all argument whatever, and is practically a claim to general infallibility. Apart from its logical inefficacy, and in confirmation of that inefficacy, it is worth noting that any such train of so-called argument, however satisfactory to a person already in agreement with the nominal conclusion, resembles, so far as every one else is concerned, the oratory of *Aeschines* already referred to, in the salient circumstance that it could never by any possibility convince anyone.

So again with Whately's third illustration of his so-called progressive argument. He says:—

"If we enquire what is the lesson that Scripture is calculated to convey to mankind, we should look not to the conclusions adopted by

"the majority of mankind, but to the conclusions towards which there has been more or less *tendency*, in proportion as men have been more or less attentive, intelligent, and candid searchers into Scripture.

"Before the Gospel appeared, we find all legislators and philosophers agreed in regarding *human good* universally as coming under the cognisance of the Civil magistrate; who accordingly was to have a complete control over the moral and religious conduct of the citizens.

"We find again that, when the Scriptures were wholly unread by all but one in ten thousand of professed Christians, the duty of rulers to wage war against infidels and to extirpate heretics was undisputed.

"When the Scriptures began to be a popular study, but were studied crudely and rashly, and when men were dazzled by being brought suddenly from darkness into light, intolerant principles did indeed still prevail, but some notions of religious liberty began to appear. As, towards the close of a rigorous winter, the earliest trees begin to open their buds, so a few distinguished characters begun to break the icy fetters of bigotry; and principles of tolerance were gradually developed.

"As the study,—and the intelligent study,—of Scripture extended, in the same degree, the opening buds, as it were, made continually further advances. In every age and country, as a general rule, tolerant principles have (however imperfectly) gained ground wherever scriptural knowledge has gained ground. And a presumption is thus afforded that a still further advance of the one would lead to a corresponding advance in the other."

Here, again, not to weary you with a detailed analysis, it is sufficient to point out that, as an argument, the contention derived from this series of propositions is entirely destitute of all syllogistic validity. No conceivable intelligible major premiss can be framed to justify the conclusion; and the conclusion itself, that wherever Scriptural knowledge has gained ground, toleration has gained ground, is absolutely inaccurate if we comprehend in this final "*dictum*," as we should logically be bound to do (if there is any logic in the argument at all), toleration on the part of individuals much

versed in Scripture knowledge. Of course, people do not now hang or burn, as they would have done some centuries ago, Dissident theologians, but this is a mere matter of detail. It is correspondent to the fact that when the first gold fever existed in California, hanging a man in that State was simply regarded as the equivalent of passing a vote of censure upon him in a more settled part of the country. In any *modern* sense of tolerance and toleration, there are few people, unfortunately, so absolutely intolerant of opinions different from those which they themselves have adopted, as those who continually rush to the armoury of Scripture, and, in doing so, continually verify the adage—

“Hic liber est in quo quærit sua dogmata quisque,  
“Invenit et pariter dogmata quisque sua.”

And now let us leave this division or branch of Rhetoric, again reiterating our general admiration of the manner in which Whately has dealt with it. We come next to the province of Persuasion as distinguished from Argument, and here we once more find that he has been extremely skilful in his treatment. The special feature of Persuasion is that it appeals to the feelings rather than to the reason; and though in this department of Rhetoric he is, to some extent, at issue with Aristotle, I apprehend that the difference is apparent rather than real. For in so far as Rhetoric is only the handmaid of Logic, it is clear that appeals to the feelings are of the nature of the fallacy of *argumentum ad hominem*, which is the general position of Aristotle in the matter; but in so far as Rhetoric is to be looked upon as a handmaiden who is emancipated from her thralldom, and has views of her own, it is evident that the power of appealing to the feelings, and the art of doing so effectually, is, as Whately points out, one of the strongest weapons in her armoury. Whilst Minerva still lay hid in the brain of

Jupiter, it would have been highly inconvenient for the virgin goddess to have flourished her spear and ægis, but when she sprang into the ether air her equipment would have been incomplete without them. An appeal to the feelings, which is effected far more, moreover, by a vivid representation of facts, than in any other way, is thus as legitimate an assistance in informing the minds of an audience as is a limelight illustration thrown for a similar purpose on a screen during the delivery of a lecture.

And now we come in our rapid survey to a more knotty and, perhaps, more practical department of Rhetoric—that of Style.

Whately's chapter upon Style is not by any means the most satisfactory part of his treatise. He appears, in the first place, rather to undervalue its importance as a department of Rhetoric. To my mind, it is really one of paramount consequence, and inasmuch as it is certainly one into which the rival claims of Logic do not in the least penetrate, it is also a field in which Rhetoric itself claims an undivided sway. Moreover, it is, of all other departments of Rhetoric, the one in which careful study is sure to bear some practical fruits. The conception and arrangement of arguments, essential though they are to successful argumentative composition, and the vivid statement of facts, will always depend much more largely upon natural powers and practice than upon any facilities acquired by educational methods; but Style is, to a very large extent, susceptible of modification and improvement.

Our author considers Style under the three different heads of Perspicuity, Energy, and Elegance, and rightly places Perspicuity in the first rank. I think he might have gone, however, still farther, and treated Energy and Elegance as merely forms of Perspicuity, and forms which deserve

their whole sanction and excellence from the degree in which they aid in the development of Perspicuity, rather than as something separate and distinct from it; for it being the one and only genuine use of language to convey the ideas of the writer or speaker to the minds of those he addresses, it is evident that Energy and Elegance are simply means to this general end, and instruments of conveying these ideas strongly and well, and are thus simply forms of Perspicuity or clearness. This, Aristotle was quite cognizant of, for he defines excellence of style as consisting in its being clear. Quintilian insists upon the same point that perspicuity is the fundamental quality of style, and again, putting the same idea in other words, says that "Discourse ought always to be obvious, even to the most callous and negligent hearer, so that the sense shall strike his mind as the light of the sun does our eyes, though they are not directed upwards to it. We must study not only that every hearer may understand us, but that it shall be impossible for him not to understand us." Locke also puts the matter yet more pithily, and makes perspicuity consist in the use of proper terms for the ideas or thoughts which he would have pass from his own mind into that of another man. And Dr. Blair, in his excellent lectures upon Rhetoric and Belles Lettres, whilst pronouncing that all the qualities of a good style may be ranged under two heads, perspicuity and ornament, would, from the general tenor of his lectures, have been the first to admit that all ornament in language which does not add to its perspicuity and intelligibility is offensive in prose or discourse to a sound taste, however permissible, or even laudable, its generous use may be in poetical composition.

I must not be supposed, however, to indicate that Whately directly, and in so many words, ignores the value of Perspicuity. Such is far from being the case, and would be the reverse of the truth. But the fact of his considering

Energy and Elegance as departments of Style, *separate* from Perspicuity, beguiles him into some inconsistency in his teaching under these different heads, which might easily lead his too trusting pupils into a rather serious error, which I shall now venture in all humility to indicate.

In dealing, then, with this quality of language called Perspicuity, Whately rightly points out, *inter alia*, that a sentence should be so constructed as that the meaning of each part can be taken in as we proceed, and he instances the following as a sentence which violates this rule:—

“It is not without a degree of patient attention and persevering diligence, greater than the generality are willing to bestow, though not greater than the object deserves, that the habit can be acquired of examining and judging of our own conduct with the same accuracy and impartiality as that of another.”

This sentence should run as follows, according to Whately, in order, of course, to obtain a higher degree of Perspicuity:—

“The habit of examining our own conduct as accurately as that of another, and judging of it with the same impartiality, cannot be acquired without a degree of patient attention and persevering diligence, not greater indeed than the object deserves, but greater than the generality are willing to bestow.”

And in this criticism Whately is undoubtedly right.

But when we come to our author's precepts with regard to Energy, Whately turns right round to some extent upon the very principle of composition under which the change in the order of the words in the above sentence or sentences has been effected. It will be observed at once that the simplicity and comparative clearness of the second form of words which I have just read to you results, in the main, from starting boldly with the nominative case or subject

of the sentence, coupling up with it, as the sentence proceeds, all the matter which belongs to it; then taking up the verb or copula; and finally winding up with the predicate, which in this case is somewhat lengthy, and itself modified by qualifying clauses. But for the purposes of Energy of Style, Whately teaches that there is often an advantage in just reversing all this—taking the predicate first, then the verb, and then the nominative case! Nearest the heart nearest the mouth, is to be the maxim, and this is to be construed not, as one might expect, of different statements or reflections, each complete in itself, but of the members or words of the sentences in which these statements or reflections are conveyed.

I do not, of course, dispute the fact that it may often be a relief to a high state of feeling to begin a sentence with a strong expletive or adjective of an expressive character, but in this branch of Rhetoric which we are now discussing we have to keep in view, not so much the *impulses* of the speaker or writer, as the order of language which shall most clearly convey his ideas with a view to producing knowledge or conviction in the hearer's or reader's mind. And this, I think, will always in English be found in the logical order which has been already indicated, and of which I shall later on have something more to say.

Not content, however, with recommending for the purposes of Energy this occasional inversion of sentences, Whately proceeds further to revel in a long Latin sentence from Q. Curtius, in which the verb itself is put last; and he would evidently have been extremely well pleased if his native tongue would have permitted him, for the purposes of Energy, to mix up his verbs, nominative cases, and predicates, in the same ingenious variety of position which you may find in the Latin classics. So much, indeed, is he possessed with this idea, that he proceeds to deal with the

subject of *Periods* in a manner which is positively misleading, which constitutes a very serious blemish upon the value to the student of this part of his treatise, and to which I must now direct your attention for the purpose of developing still further this part of our subject in a satisfactory manner.

Aristotle, who had, so far as I am aware, invented the term, had defined a period as a form of words which has independently in itself a beginning and an ending, and a length easily taken in at a glance ; which is a perfectly clear and reasonable definition. But Whately, cutting loose from Aristotle, which he very seldom does elsewhere, declines to enter into any examination of the senses in which other authors have employed the term *Period*, and gives it a definition of his own, under cover of which he pushes still further the dangerous heresy to the practical speaker which springs out of the recommended latitude in the art of sentence building to which I have already referred. By a Period, he tells us, is to be understood, in *his* treatise, any sentence, whether simple or complex, which is so framed that the grammatical construction will not admit of a close before the end of it ; in which, in short, the meaning remains suspended, as it were, till the whole is finished. A loose sentence, on the contrary, is any that is *not* a Period : any, the construction of which *will* allow of a stop so as to form a perfect sentence at one or more places before we arrive at the end.

Now bearing in mind that, for the purposes of Perspicuity, Whately has already told us that a sentence should preferably be understood clause by clause, as in the instance I have already given, one would rather expect next to find that, after defining Periods and Loose Sentences in the manner just stated, Whately was about to praise the latter and condemn the former. But no ! Now that he is dealing with Energy of Style he exactly reverses this process, con-

demns loose sentences and praises periods, and thus sets up by inference the extraordinary paradox that Energy of Style and Perspicuity of Style may be opposed to each other. This would not appear so strange, perhaps, if he were discussing the department of Delivery, but such is not the case; we have here simply and only to do with the order and arrangement of words; and if Energy of style is in this last respect simply, as I hold, an element in Perspicuity of style, such an antagonism is obviously impossible and absurd. I apprehend, that in real truth, Whately's *loose* sentences, as he terms them, are, both for all practical use and theoretic excellence, far superior to his periods. Take, for example, his own illustration:—

“We came to our journey's end at last, with no small difficulty, after much fatigue, through deep roads and bad weather.”

This, which is, as he says, a very loose sentence, is infinitely more desirable than the variation which he, with some commendation, substitutes for it:—

“At last, after much fatigue, through deep roads and bad weather, we came, with no small difficulty, to our journey's end.”

No one, I think, approaching the matter in hand without that previous bias which a lengthy training in Latin rather than in English is calculated to give, could hesitate to condemn this approved period of Whately's as a most lamentable inversion of the Queen's English.

It may indeed, perhaps, occur to some of my audience that there is something savouring of hypercriticism in dwelling so much upon a mere detail of composition. But composition is in itself a mere matter of detail, and there can be no more dangerous advice to anyone who has occasion

to speak in public than to fall into the habit of composing his ideas into Whatelean periods. Just as a sentence is easier for an audience to understand if it proceeds clause by clause, each approximately complete in itself, so also is it easier for the speaker thus to express himself without losing the thread or connecting link of his ideas. And if a speaker cultivates the mannerism of suspending the sense, after Whately's method, till the completion of the sentence lays it before his audience "*totus teres atque rotundus*," he is really courting the danger of breaking down in the middle, forgetting the general effect of the beginning, and floundering hopelessly in the endeavour to find some end or termination at which he can get out of the verbal labyrinth in which he has involved himself. Nothing can really save any speaker from being at some time or other involved in this disagreeable predicament, except cultivating the habit of keeping a tight grip of his nominative case, and producing it before his audience at the earliest possible moment.

These considerations are of sufficient practical importance to be worth verifying in every reasonable way in our power, and there are two methods at least by which this may be done. In the first place, we may look at the structure of a sentence theoretically. Whately denies that there is such a thing as a natural order in this regard, and points to the Latin writers to show that there may be an order of words in general use entirely different from that which, in my view, should be claimed as the natural order of an English sentence. But the fact is that there has been as truly an evolution in language as in everything else. Just as the moderns have abandoned the inflectional cases of the ancient tongues, and substituted for them the more convenient machinery of prepositions; just as they have in our own language, at any rate, simplified the genders by broad and easily remembered generalisations; so also have

mankind in the course of practice attained a higher degree of theoretic perfection in sentence building than had been reached in the days of Rome. With the ancients there can be little doubt that a certain rhythm or melody was specially aimed at as the leading quality of a fine sentence. Even Quintilian, with his practical ideas, tells us that an oration has in it something of the nature of song: *Est in dicendo etiam quidam cantus obscurior*. And Julius Cæsar noted this practice, when carried to a greater excess than his individual taste would sanction, by passing upon a reader the criticism, *Si cantas male cantas, si leges cantas* (if you are singing, you are singing badly; if you read, you are singing). It was probably with a view to this rhythmical effect, which no doubt produced upon the more ignorant hearers of the orators of old something of the delightful sensation experienced by the old lady through the frequent mention in a modern sermon of "that blessed word Mesopotamia," that Cicero and others arranged their sentences with much latitude in the matter of mixing up their nominative cases, adverbs, verbs, and predicates into a sonorous passage of sound, rather than into a clear and lucid exposition of the ideas enshrined. But modern taste is much more severe, and I may add, more correct. Any effort to obtain rhythmical effect from this arrangement of the words in a sentence, excepting of course in poetry, would be most offensive to nearly every audience. I have been told that in sermons delivered in the Welsh language such an effect is sometimes sought after, but this is a matter of delivery rather than of the words employed, and is even then a very exceptional thing. The old lady who, when asked if she had understood the sermon, replied, "Wad I hae the presumption?" does *not* go to church now, and her place in all audiences is supplied by people who wish above all things to understand what is said to them, and to do so with the least possible effort to themselves.

And bearing this fact in mind, we arrive easily at the most appropriate and suitable theoretical form of a sentence.

All things that may be said or written carry with them, and become constituted by, the process termed in logic *abscissio infiniti* (a cutting off of the infinite). Before the speaker opens his lips he may theoretically say anything. Every word he utters should, therefore, more and more *limit* to a certain definite proposition the statement he is making, until, by the close of the sentence, the meaning he would convey by it, taken as a whole, stands out clear and unmistakable. The more completely and sharply each word, as the sentence proceeds, *cuts off* the individual meaning it is moulded to convey from all other possible statements, the more clear that meaning is to the audience or reader. Now the first and sharpest limitation of all is obviously the nominative case or subject of the sentence. Once that is stated the audience or reader has had cut off for them an immense range of possible matter, and knows at least what it is that the speaker or writer is talking about. The qualifying phrases relating to this subject of the sentence then naturally express its further limitations; the verb or copula follows, still further chiselling out the precise tenor of the sentence, giving what is termed in quaternions its vector; and lastly, the predicate, with its various clauses (if there are more than one), completes the whole. It is not possible by any reverse order to complete the meaning with strokes equally as clean and palpable to those who are addressed, and thus, as a matter of theory, the arrangement suggested, and in general use in the English tongue, is by much the soundest.

It is interesting, moreover, to review, in confirmation of these theoretic considerations, the practice of some few great English writers and speakers in this regard. I cannot, of course, do this very fully, as it would occupy too much time;

but I have selected for the purpose, without any *ex parte* intention, amongst writers, Charles Lamb and Macaulay, and amongst speakers, Mr. Gladstone; and I shall give, by way of illustration, some short passages taken at random from each of them.

Taking up first then the *Essays of Elia*, I have dropped at haphazard upon Lamb's delightful description of our old friend Sarah Battle:—

"A clear fire—a clean hearth—and the rigour of the game. This "was the celebrated wish of old Sarah Battle—now with God—who, "next to her devotions, loved a good game at whist. She was none of "your lukewarm gamesters,—your half-and-half players, who have no "objection to take a hand,—if you want one to make up a rubber; who "affirm that they have no pleasure in winning; that they like to win "one game,—and lose another; that they can while away an hour very "agreeably at a card table,—but are indifferent whether they play or "no; and will desire an adversary, who has slipt a wrong card, to take "it up—and play another. These insufferable triflers are the curse of "a table. One of these flies will spoil a whole pot. Of such it may "be said, that they do not play at cards,—but only play at playing "them." \*

The very slightest examination of these quite characteristic sentences of Charles Lamb's will show that they are, according to Whately's definition, as loose as they well can be. You can divide them nearly all in two, sometimes in many more than two, parts, and still leave the first part or parts complete in themselves. I dare not myself attempt to translate upon this occasion these sentences into periods of the Whately type, as such a sacrilege might well develop an undesirable state of mind on the part of my audience. But if anyone will kindly perform the ungracious task when there is no one else at hand to denounce the atrocity of his

\* The hyphens are not in the original of this and the two succeeding quotations, but are inserted to show the possible breaks which, according to Whately, constitute the sentences into which they enter loose sentences.

conduct, he will find that poor Sarah Battle's shade would certainly pursue him with vindictive retribution, if permitted to survey the result of his labours.

And now, let us take Macaulay. His fine description of the Puritans\* is a very characteristic passage, and exhibits the peculiar beauties of his style as well, perhaps, as any other in his writings. It is as follows:—

“ Thus the Puritan was made up of two different men,—the one all  
 “ self-abasement,—penitence,—gratitude,—passion, the other proud,—  
 “ calm,—inflexible,—sagacious. He prostrated himself in the dust—  
 “ before his Maker: but he set his foot on the neck of his king. In his  
 “ devotional retirement, he prayed—with convulsions,—and groans,—  
 “ and tears. He was half maddened by glorious or terrible illusions.  
 “ He heard the lyres of angels—or the tempting whispers of fiends.  
 “ He caught a glimpse of the Beatific Vision—or woke screaming from  
 “ dreams of everlasting fire. Like Vane, he thought himself intrusted  
 “ with the sceptre—of the millennial year. Like Fleetwood, he cried  
 “ in the bitterness of his soul—that God had hid his face—from him.  
 “ But when he took his seat in the council, or girt on his sword for  
 “ war, these tempestuous workings of the soul had left no perceptible  
 “ trace—behind them. People who saw nothing of the godly but their  
 “ uncouth visages, and heard nothing from them but their groans and  
 “ their whining hymns, might laugh at them. But those had little  
 “ reason to laugh who encountered them in the hall of debate—or in  
 “ the field of battle. These fanatics brought to civil and military  
 “ affairs a coolness of judgment and an immutability of purpose which  
 “ some writers have thought inconsistent with their religious zeal,—  
 “ but which were in fact the necessary effects of it. The intensity of  
 “ their feelings on one subject made them tranquil—on every other.  
 “ One overpowering sentiment had subjected to itself pity and hatred—  
 “ ambition and fear. Death had lost its terrors—and pleasure its  
 “ charms. They had their smiles—and their tears,—their raptures and  
 “ their sorrows,—but not for the things of this world. Enthusiasm  
 “ had made them Stoics,—had cleared their minds from every vulgar  
 “ passion—and prejudice,—and raised them above the influence of  
 “ danger—and of corruption. It sometimes might lead them to pursue  
 “ unwise ends,—but never to choose unwise means. They went

\* *Essay on Milton.*

"through the world, like Sir Artegal's iron man Talus—with his flail,—  
 "crushing and trampling down oppressors,—mingling with human  
 "beings,—but having neither part nor lot in human infirmities,—  
 "insensible to fatigue,—to pleasure,—and to pain,—not to be pierced  
 "by any weapon,—not to be withstood by any barrier."

There is hardly a sentence in this magnificent description which would not, according to Whately, be a loose sentence in respect of the fact that it could stop short—in some cases stop short very often—before reaching its actual close; and still, in its curtailed form, be grammatically complete, as well as convey an intelligible and definite meaning. And the usage of Macaulay in this regard is all the more important from our present point of view for two excellent reasons. First, because the antithetical nature of his style would naturally have led him to the large use of Whately's periods, if he had not intentionally striven to avoid such a construction. And secondly, because while Macaulay's style could not be termed periodic according to Whately's definitions, it is so in a very high degree indeed, according to the much sounder and more practical definition of Aristotle, which Whately unceremoniously and unwisely set aside.

One short passage from a great speech of Mr. Gladstone is all I can venture to give by way of completing our illustrations. It is taken from his Edinburgh speech of November, 1885; and is, in fact, the peroration of this, which is unquestionably one of the latest of his finer efforts.

"I have pointed to the words of Lord Salisbury—and have shown  
 "you how these declarations of Mr. Parnell have poured life and  
 "fervour and joy into his soul. He now begins to see his way to what  
 "he thinks this blessed and happy combination of perhaps 250 or 260  
 "Tories, and 70 or 90 Nationalists. Using his arithmetical faculty,  
 "putting these together, he makes out that they will not leave enough

“in the House of Commons for a strong and a Liberal party—to overbear them. Register in your minds these facts—store in your minds the declarations of Mr. Parnell against us—they are the strongest arguments in our favour. They are the strongest testimonies to our conduct—they are the firm supports given to the proposition which I laid before you—that in this election you will not have to decide upon any mere party object—in a lower and secondary sense—you will not have to decide only upon the question whether the business of civilising legislation is, as heretofore, energetically and satisfactorily to proceed—but you have also got to decide whether you will take the precautions necessary to insure that, if great Imperial topics shall be raised, appertaining to the relations between England and Ireland, the unity of the Empire, and to the content and prosperity of that distracted country, you are determined that these great issues shall be tried by men who have received your commission—from a position of security—and not from the slippery footing of slavish dependency.”

These fine sentences are evidently in the main, according to Whately, loose sentences; and I think we may take it therefore, without pursuing our investigation further, that we have established the fact that Whately's bias upon this matter of detail is, as a matter of fact, in direct opposition to what has been the practice of some of the greatest masters of the English tongue.

We have now reached in our discussion that which is, in modern view, the last department of Rhetoric—that of Delivery, or Elocution. Some ancient writers, indeed, included within the sphere of the art the two further departments of Gesture and Memory; but however worthy these two outlying poles of the Art of Rhetoric may be of survey, I shall not myself attempt the task, inasmuch as that of dealing with Delivery itself, in the usual sense of the term, takes me quite sufficiently far out of my own latitude. I am quite of opinion, however, upon this, our last head

to-night, that Whately's views with reference to the matter are not entirely sound, although, as usual with him, clearly stated, and in many respects very useful. In contending, and rightly contending, as he does in dealing with this department of the subject, for a natural manner and natural delivery, he goes to a great and unjustifiable extreme in his practical precepts for attaining these *desiderata*. He protests against all artificial methods of acquiring a good Elocution, and lays it down substantially that the only way to reach excellence in this department of Rhetoric, and to make use, with this view, of such modulation of voice, etc., as are suitable to each word and passage, is to fix the mind earnestly on the meaning, and leave nature and habit to suggest the utterance.

Now, the *latter* part of the precept thus conveyed is no doubt true in regard to any individual or particular effort the speaker or rhetorician is making *at the time* he is making it. It would certainly be most offensive to any auditor were the speaker or reader to convey in any way the idea that he was listening, as it were, to the sound of his own voice. But it does not by any means follow, as laid down in the earlier part of the same didactic sentence, that there is no advantage to be derived from the use of artificial methods and training upon other and suitable occasions. No one, indeed, can possibly write with less authority and experience upon such a subject than myself, but I am quite of the opinion, at one time expressed by Professor Seeley in a lecture upon Education, that, at any rate, young people should be taught elocution. He said:—

“To this I attach great importance. It is more than one hundred years since Bishop Berkeley propounded the question—whether half the learning and talent in England had not been lost because Elocution was not taught in schools and colleges. And it is not merely for its practical use in after life to those whose profession

"demands public speaking that I desire to see Elocution made a part of education, but because by this means, more than by any other, may be evolved in the minds of boys a taste for poetry and eloquence."

This last reflection of Professor Seeley's is, of course, aside of our main issue to-night, but the *general* tenor of the whole passage is extremely just, and serves as an apt rejoinder to Whately's protests against system and methods in regard to Delivery.

Perhaps, however, the most striking and complete reply which can be made to Whately upon this point of the desirability or otherwise of the employment of system and artificial methods for the purpose of obtaining a good Elocution, is the following which was originated by George Vandenhoff, who ingeniously performed the fine dialectic manœuvre of turning against our author's position in this matter the same verbal artillery which the Archbishop himself had used in dealing with another subject, *i.e.*, the defence and justification of the study of Logic.

Whately had thus vindicated the importance of logical study:—

"If it were enquired what is to be regarded as the most appropriate intellectual occupation of man as man, what would be the answer? The statesman is engaged with political affairs; the soldier, with military; the mathematician, with the properties of numbers and magnitudes; the merchant, with commercial concerns, etc.; but in what are all and each of these employed?—employed I mean as men—for there are many modes of exercise of the faculties, mental as well as bodily, which are in great measure common to us with the lower animals. Evidently in Reasoning. They are all occupied in deducing well or ill conclusions from Premises; each concerning the subject of his own particular business. If, therefore, it be found that the process going on daily in each of so many different minds is in any respect the same, and if the principles on which it is conducted can be reduced to a regular system, and if rules can be deduced from that

"system for the better conducting of the process, then it can hardly be denied that such a system and such rules must be especially worthy the attention—not of the members of this or that profession merely, but—of everyone who is desirous of possessing a cultivated mind. To understand the theory of that which is the appropriate intellectual occupation of man in general, and to learn to do that well—which everyone will and must do, whether well or ill—may surely be considered as an essential part of a liberal education."

An exactly similar train of considerations, however, obviously applies to Delivery, or Elocution, just as well as to Reasoning. To see this, you simply substitute in the passage quoted the word "Elocution" for the word "Reasoning," and you have the demonstration at once. The main antecedent of the passage would then be paraphrased thus:—"If the principles of a good (*elocution*) can be reduced to a regular system" (which is exactly what Vandenhoff and others well qualified to judge contend); and the conclusion, that "to learn to do that well, which everyone will and must do well or ill, may surely be considered as an essential part of a liberal education"—then evidently applies to, and follows in respect of, the art of Delivery, as truly as of that of Reasoning. But Whately's subsequent statements on the same subject of Logic bring out Vandenhoff's successful assault upon him still more clearly, and fairly clinch the argumentative nail in his temples. For he proceeds as follows:—

"Many who allow the use of systematic principles in other things are accustomed to cry up Common Sense as the sufficient and only safe guide in Reasoning.—"


For the word "Reasoning" just substitute again, as we go along, the word "(Elocution)," and observe how Whately's logical guns, when appropriately reloaded, once more thunder upon his own rhetorical flank! He goes on to say:—

"Now, by Common Sense is meant, I apprehend (when the term  
 "is used with any distinct meaning), an exercise of the judgment,  
 "unaided by Art, or system of rules; such an exercise as we must  
 "necessarily employ in numberless cases of daily occurrence; in which,  
 "having no established principles to guide us—no line of procedure,  
 "as it were, distinctly chalked out—we must needs act on the best  
 "extemporaneous conjectures we can form. He who is eminently  
 "skilful in doing this, is said to possess a superior degree of Common  
 "Sense. But that Common Sense is only our *second best* guide—that  
 "the rules of Art, if judiciously framed, are always desirable when  
 "they can be had—is an assertion for the truth of which I may appeal  
 "to the testimony of mankind in general; which is so much the more  
 "valuable inasmuch as it may be accounted the testimony of *adver-*  
 "*saries*. For the generality have a strong predilection in favour of  
 "Common Sense, except in those points in which they respectively  
 "possess the knowledge of a system of rules; but in these points,  
 "they deride anyone who trusts to unaided Common Sense. A Sailor,  
 "*e.g.*, will perhaps despise the pretensions of medical men, and prefer  
 "treating a disease by Common Sense; but he would ridicule the  
 "proposal of navigating a ship by Common Sense, without regard to  
 "the maxims of nautical art. A Physician, again, will perhaps  
 "contemn Systems of Political Economy, of Logic, or Metaphysics,  
 "and insist on the superior wisdom of trusting to Common Sense in  
 "such matters; but he would never approve of trusting to Common  
 "Sense in the treatment of diseases. Neither again would the  
 "Architect recommend a reliance on Common Sense alone in building,  
 "nor the Musician in music, to the neglect of those systems of rules  
 "which, in their respective arts, have been deduced from scientific  
 "reasoning, aided by experience. And the induction might be  
 "extended to every department of practice. Since, therefore, each  
 "gives the preference to unassisted Common Sense only in those cases  
 "where he himself has nothing else to trust to, and invariably resorts  
 "to the rules of art wherever he possesses the knowledge of them,  
 "it is plain that mankind universally bear their testimony, though  
 "unconsciously, and often unwillingly, to the preferableness of  
 "systematic knowledge to conjectural judgment."

All this is admirably put and exceedingly true, but how  
 obvious it is that it all is as true of Delivery, or Elocution,

as of anything else. And thus, Whately the Rhetorician, who will not admit of system in Elocution, is pulverised by Whately the Logician, who exalts in all other things the Rules of Art above the untaught dictates of Common Sense.

You are now all, without doubt, sufficiently wearied of this long prelection. In conclusion, I would simply once again remind you that whilst criticising to some extent certain parts of Whately's *System of Rhetoric*, I cannot too strongly express my general admiration of that work as a whole, or urge too strongly upon those Philomaths who have not read it to do so when opportunity serves. It would have been impossible for me, within the time at my disposal, to have attempted anything like a complete treatise upon the Art of Rhetoric, and the best substitute I have been able to offer has been, therefore, to graft these reflections, which I wished to bring before you, on a work of acknowledged merit, the perusal of which, with some additional interest to yourselves, will perhaps repay and compensate you to some extent for the kind attention you have given to my dissertation this evening.



**THE PROBLEM OF NATIONALITY.**

**BY**

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## THE PROBLEM OF NATIONALITY.

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It is often said that when a man is called upon to enter into converse with his fellow-men in a capacity which is not peculiarly his own, he ought to take care to avoid those topics which happen to be particularly associated with the business or profession he pursues. To "talk shop," when the shop is locked up for the day, is considered to display the very worst of taste. On the other hand, as has been pointed out by a distinguished writer, the subjects on which a man must be held most qualified to speak with weight and intelligence are those which are intimately connected with, or are suggested by, the occupation to which the main portion of his life is devoted; and as the object of the intellectual intercourse of men is the exchange of ideas and the development of thought, not merely with the view of realising the pleasure of mental exercise, but also, and mainly, for the purpose of eliciting truth, it follows that when the responsibility devolves upon one of attempting to engage the attention of his fellows by the discussion of some theme that may be of interest to them, he is far more likely to succeed in his object if he select a subject from his own sphere of knowledge or study, than if he approach some new topic which requires to be specially read up for the occasion.

It is because I deem this principle to be valid that I venture to submit to the consideration of the Philomathic Society some thoughts on a subject which comes within the scope of the speculations with which I am, as a rule, more immediately occupied. I have the less hesitation, however,

in treating of such a theme before a Society so wide and general in its character as that which I am addressing, since it happens that the subject—though I have not approached it from this point of view—stands in some sort of relation with more than one of the great political questions of the day, and, in the opinion of some politicians at least, may have an important bearing upon the solution of those problems.

One of the results of the Franco-Prussian war of 1870-71 was an immense accession of strength to the national spirit in Germany. The creation of a powerful German Empire—an empire in fact, and not merely in name—was at once the outcome of this revived national feeling and the cause of a heightened patriotism and national enthusiasm throughout the federal states which agreed to be thus consolidated. For a time this new nationalism became the supreme impelling influence in every political and social movement throughout the country. Intoxicated with their success at arms, and elated at the supremacy to which almost at one bound they had leaped, the Germans began to regard the national feeling in the light of a religion, and to bow down before it as an object of worship. It was inevitable that such an exaggerated devotion to one idea should betray enthusiasts into a certain contraction of vision and narrowness of feeling. Only the most large-minded and generous men can stand the strain of an extension of the heart-strings in various directions at the same time. With the ordinary run of people, a prolonged stretch of sentiment in one direction implies a shrinking in some other. Hence the extreme homage paid to the national feeling in Germany was productive of some amount of prejudice and bigotry. The cry of "Germany for the Germans," which soon resounded throughout the length and breadth of the land, bore some-

what unlovely fruit in the banishment of numerous aliens who had settled in the towns, but who unluckily had not become naturalized German citizens. A curious attempt was made to purge the language of foreign terms, especially those used in the political and official business of the country, and to substitute for them words which sounded with a pure Teutonic ring. But the most remarkable manifestation of this newly engendered narrowness was a bold attempt to deny to a certain section of the population the right of participation in the commonwealth of the nation, because they differed from the great mass of their neighbours in race and in creed. It was on these two grounds that the Jews of Germany became, to a considerable number of patriotic Germans, an obnoxious element in the country. These heated partizans formed themselves into an association for the expression and promotion of their views. Anxious to repudiate the notion that they were prompted by animus against any particular class of individuals, they left out from their title all direct reference to the real objects of their attack, and called themselves the Anti-Semitic League ; nevertheless, their avowed object was the exclusion of the Jews from all civil and political rights, while not a few of their body boldly demanded the expulsion of all members of the Jewish race from German soil. From hundreds of platforms in various parts of Germany the doctrine was published that the existing remnant of the Jewish race, dispersed though it was throughout every quarter of the globe, yet formed a separate nation, distinct from the various nationalities with which it mingled or came into contact. The Jews residing in Germany, it was declared, were not and could not be a part of the German nation. It mattered little or nothing to these propagandists of the new-fangled nationalism, that the class of inhabitants whom they thus endeavoured to proscribe were born and bred on the soil of

the Fatherland, that their progenitors had lived there for many generations, that they served in the German army and fought for the German cause, that they had been admitted into the Parliament of the nation, that they took an active part in all social and intellectual movements, that they studied in the Universities, edited German newspapers, wrote German books, advocated loyalty to the Emperor of Germany. These considerations were of absolutely no import in face of the fact that Jews were of a different race and creed from those to which the bulk of the German nation belonged, and therefore *a priori* were incapable of sympathising with the national aspirations and rallying round the national institutions.

Now it will be observed that in this position there is involved a fundamental question, about the calm and philosophic discussion of which the Anti-Semitic League did not much trouble itself, but the logical answer to which really determines the genuineness or spuriousness of their arguments, and disposes, in fact, of the mists of doubt and vague speculation which gather around the whole attitude of nationalism. In short, we need an answer to the question : What constitutes a nation ? What are the conditions of nationality ? What are the marks of likeness common to all the individuals composing a nation, yet, at the same time, distinguishing those individuals from those of their fellow-creatures that belong to other nations ? It is with this fundamental problem that I propose to deal : a problem apparently very simple of solution, but upon closer examination clearly bristling with difficulties ; and while I am fully conscious of my inability to treat the subject exhaustively, yet I may perhaps take credit for leading the Society into paths not too often trodden, but which are not by any means cut off from the highway of current political thought.

It may, indeed, seem strange at first sight that the

problem of nationality—the question of what a nation really is—has not received that meed of attention from the political philosophers of this country which its importance merits. No doubt we occasionally hear a partial and casual discussion of the subject in connection with the advocacy of individual claims and the promotion of special political pretensions; such as when the peculiar wants and characteristics of the Welsh are insisted upon at an Eisteddfod, or when the toast of “Ireland, a nation,” is drunk on St. Patrick’s Day in Dublin. But so far as I have been able to discover there has been no attempt to present to English readers a careful analysis of the idea of nationality apart from any preconceived views; there exists, so far as I am aware, no treatise in English having for its special object to expound the conception which the word nation suggests—to discriminate between the essential conditions upon which the existence of a nation as such is based, and those more or less accidental circumstances which may happen to enter into and govern its life and character. In France and Germany the very reverse is the case. French literature can boast of a most instructive essay on the subject, written by so distinguished an author as M. Rénan,\* and marked by the luminous style and the clearness of thought for which that celebrated *litterateur* is famous; while in various magazines of Germany weighty papers are to be met with, which constitute valuable contributions towards the elucidation of the problem. It is not difficult, however, to account for this defect of our literature as compared with that of continental nations. The political conditions which have subsisted both in France and Germany within the present century—indeed, I might add throughout their whole history—have been such as to produce constant confusion in the minds of the people of those realms as to what the determining factors of the integrity of a nation

\* *Qu'est-ce qu'une Nation.* Paris, 1882.

are. In France, the form of government has undergone, within living memory, a rapid succession of fundamental changes; while, at the same time, conquest by a foreign power has necessitated the marking out of a new line of frontier. As regards Germany, the issue of various international conflicts in recent times has produced still greater alterations in the boundaries of the Imperial dominions; while the peculiar constitution of the Empire, whereby many states which previously were almost, if not absolutely, independent, have been federated and reduced to a position of more or less dependence on one central state, has had the effect of still more perplexing the popular mind, and of causing a re-examination of accepted views on the subject of the limits of nationality. In England there have been no such disturbing elements at work. For more than two centuries we have had a stable and universally acknowledged form of government, while the well-defined boundaries of our country, partly determined by our insular position, have afforded a sort of rough and ready solution of the question, which seemed to satisfy for the time being, and rather to repress than invite a logical inquiry into the subject. Yet it will scarcely be gainsaid that Englishmen, of all people, ought to have settled convictions on such a matter as the nature and constitution of a nation. Considering that our home government embraces four distinct countries that were once four independent kingdoms; that abroad we possess vast colonies peopled, in some cases, by great heterogeneous masses of inhabitants; and that a stream of emigration from these shores has gone on for many years, resulting in the settlement of English-speaking people in all parts of the habitable globe, it would certainly be of advantage, even for practical purposes, that we should have clear and fixed ideas as to what a nation is, and what it is not.

There is an old story to the effect that an Englishman, a

Frenchman, and a German were once entrusted with the task of investigating the nature and habits of the camel, and of embodying the results of their researches in a treatise. The Englishman at once packed up his traps and set off for the deserts of Egypt, where he proposed to study the question on the spot. The Frenchman so far yielded to the practical exigencies of the case as to pay a visit to a menagerie which contained some specimens of the famous oriental quadruped. But the German locked himself up in his study, and produced a learned and weighty dissertation on the subject which he had evolved out of his inner consciousness. I hope no one will imagine that the application of the anecdote lies in the undervaluing of the French and German contributions to our present theme ; but perhaps a native English subject, whose immediate ancestors were Germans, and who belongs to an ancient race distinct from any of the great races that have peopled Europe, may be able in an especial degree to appreciate the perplexing doubts that surround the principle of nationality, and may be in possession of a sort of practical standard by which to test the various statements of that principle.

Let us look at the problem a little more closely. Surveying the various agglomerations of the human species, we find that the social organism assumes many different forms, one of which is the class to be specially investigated. Among the groups to be met with in this survey may be mentioned races, such as the Mongolian or the Malay ; tribes, such as the early Hebrews ; empires, consisting of a number of countries united either by conquest, such as Rome, or by common consent, such as Germany ; confederations, such as Switzerland and America ; communities, existing by reason of a common religion or exclusive customs, but possessing no territory, such as the Parsees and the Gypsies ; clans, such as are met with in Scottish and

early English history; and nations, such as the English and French. It is not of course meant that these groups are mutually exclusive. They may be represented by circles, which in some cases touch, in others intersect, and in certain others coincide with each other. But our task is to differentiate the group nation from all other aggregations of men; to set up a principle, if it is possible to find one, which may apply equally in all cases, and give definiteness and precision to the language we employ in speaking of national attributes and aspirations. It is quite clear that if this principle exists, it must be capable of accommodating itself to the most diverse conditions and the most dissimilar circumstances. The Swiss are a nation no less than the Germans; the Dutch no less than the English. Why are the Scotch a nation, but not the Australians; the Americans, but not the New Zealanders? Again, why do we speak of the Hungarian nation, but of the Prussian people?

If, in framing our definition of what a nation is, we were to be guided by the language of the current literature of the day—the language employed in political speeches and leading articles—we should find ourselves hopelessly tossed about amid a number of the most various, not to say contradictory, propositions. A considerable list of characteristics might be mentioned, each of which is at various times and in different writings set up as the determining mark of nationality. Thus, it is assumed by one that *territory* is the main consideration, so that a nation would mean a group of individuals comprehended within the same geographical limits. A second conveys the idea that the *state* constitutes the real criterion of nationality, so that a nation would signify a section of the human race the members of which are united to each other, and which is differentiated from other sections, by allegiance to a common political authority, be that authority a sovereign or the acknowledged head of a Republic. A

third implies that nationality is all a matter of *descent* or *race*: a nation is a particular branch of some ethnographical stock or family. A fourth assumes that the extent of a nation is defined by *philology*, or, in other words, that a nation is an aggregate of men speaking the same language. And in like manner it is sometimes superficially asserted that such factors as the religion, the habits and customs, or the physical characteristics of a group of men are sufficient to serve as a sign or badge of the nationality to which they belong.

Now in order to clear up the vagueness which seems to envelope the subject, and so that we may not "float in a sea of doubt, hesitate and flounder," it will be necessary to examine the popular theories just stated, to deal with them in the light of history, and to submit them to the test of the existing condition of things.

1. Let us begin with the statement that a nation is defined by geographical boundaries. I might, perhaps, at once add that by the term geographical in this sense is obviously implied political, not physical geography. It would occur to no one to imagine that the boundaries marked out by nature—by the physical configuration of the earth's surface—are to be taken as outlines limiting the extent of nations. In ancient times, undoubtedly, these natural barriers were the important, often the chief, causes of the separation of one nation from another. In a primitive state of society, seas and mountains effectually divided mankind into distinct groups, and geographical divisions were therefore almost identical with the segregation of nations. With the advance of even the earliest forms of civilization this identity speedily vanished; the natural boundaries on the earth's surface yielded to invention and industry, and ceased to be impediments to the expansion and intermingling of mankind; so that, though even to the present

day, mountains and seas have some effect in the formation of nations, yet there is perhaps no single nation which is entirely marked off by the limits known to physical geography.

But is the case different when we consider political or historical boundaries? According to this view, the decisive mark of a nation's unity would be the frontiers of a country; the lines of demarcation as determined by law or agreed upon by common consent. Now, the chief point lost sight of in this hypothesis is that the frontier of a country is continually liable to be moved. In some parts of the world the boundary lines of two adjacent countries are in a state of continual oscillation. But in the recent history of Europe we have ample demonstration of fluctuations in the political confines of countries. By the last Franco-Prussian war the provinces of Alsace and Lorraine were transferred to the German Empire, and it would follow, if territory were an infallible test of nationality, that the inhabitants of these provinces, after having been Frenchmen since the days of Napoleon, suddenly became Germans in 1870. A still more instructive example is afforded by the conquest and dismemberment of the Kingdom of Poland. Through this vast change in the international politics of Europe, the old political boundaries of the country of Poland have been entirely obliterated, and new limits defining the frontiers of Russia, Prussia, and Austria, substituted in their place. But because the Kingdom of Poland has vanished from the map of Europe, will any one contend that Polish nationality vanished simultaneously? Such a deduction would be sufficiently disposed of by the language in common use in all the countries of Europe, and by the fact that a Pole is an individual as distinct as ever he was, either from a Russian or a German, with whom no one would knowingly confound him.

Another consideration which completely sets aside the test of geography is to be found in the migrations of men from their old settlements, and the colonization of discovered or subjugated territory by members of the same nation. The Australians, that is to say, the settlers from this country or their descendants, not of course the aborigines, are still an integral portion of the English nation. So are the New Zealanders. So are half the Canadians—there is a Canadian people, but no Canadian nation. The same remark applies, indeed, to the English in any of our colonies; thus proving how little geography can control nationality, and despite the peculiar feeling of loyalty to one's country, to what a large extent the historical development of nations sets at defiance the limits of the soil on which they were cradled.

2. We have now to deal with the theory that allegiance to the same political state is an adequate mark of nationality. If this theory be true, then all individuals who belong to a particular state, all who take part in its duties and rights, constitute a nation, while all others must be excluded therefrom.

It must here be remarked for the sake of distinctness, that *state* differs in a material sense from country. As far as country is concerned, the question of nationality has been already dealt with in considering the geographical divisions of a continent. But a state is to some extent, though not by any means invariably, independent of geographical limitations. When we speak of the States of Europe, we mean not the countries, but the various great aggregates of men, united by some kind of common political bond, and acknowledging one central political head or authority. It is evident that a state may, and often does, include several countries; and further, that those countries are not necessarily adjacent, but may even be intersected by states other than that to which they belong.

Now it may suit the purposes of a government to enact in its statute-book that all the subjects of a state shall be held to be of the same nationality, but no one will contend that this is anything else than a legal technicality, answering to no objective reality in the nature or consciousness of mankind. There is, in fact, scarcely a state in Europe whose subjects are all of one nationality, while in some of the states, the dividing-line between one nation and another is broadly and permanently marked. The Austrian Empire is an agglomeration of kingdoms and other political divisions which, in the course of ages, have clustered round the hereditary domains of the House of Hapsburg. The supposition that the various nations included in the empire have become fused, and that out of a number of miscellaneous elements a new Austrian nation has been forged hitherto unknown to history, is at variance with any sound view of the existing situation. Under certain conditions, it is true, such an evolution is not impossible. We have seen it take place in the case of the United States, the people of whom, it is now generally acknowledged, form what is called the American nation. But the merging of several nationalities into one is a very rare event in history; it by no means follows the creation of a new political state. The Hungarians have preserved, and are likely to continue to preserve, their national individuality, despite their inclusion in the Austrian empire. Norway was formerly tributary to Denmark; in 1814, it was added to Sweden. Does any one suppose that the Norwegians were once Danes and that they are now Swedes? It would be useless to multiply instances, but we have only to consider the constitution of our own kingdom to perceive the radical unsoundness of the hypothesis that all the subjects of the same political state belong to one nation.

But in order to complete the argument, and as a further step towards the elucidation of the subject, it may be shown

that the converse proposition is likewise untenable. Not only is it untrue that all the individuals owing allegiance to the same political head are necessarily of one nationality, but it can likewise be demonstrated that sections of the same nation may serve different monarchs and be subject to governments completely independent of each other. A striking example is afforded by the Italian nation. Any one who supposes that the Italian nation came into existence through the formation of the Kingdom of Italy, under Victor Emmanuel, in 1861, and that until then the people now called Italians belonged to the Sicilian, Sardinian, Austrian, and other nations, completely ignores all reason and truth. Perhaps it would be impossible to determine with exactness at what epoch of history the individuality of the Italian nation first stood out as a distinct conception in the mind of Europe. Probably it was one of the new forms of life that slowly emerged from the crumbling ruins of the Roman Empire. But at all events, all through the history of the powerful commonwealths, into which Italy was divided in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries; through the period of its subjection to Spain, in the seventeenth; and subsequently through the era immediately preceding the present, when it was split up into numerous petty principalities and kingdoms, it is impossible to deny to the Italian peoples a certain cohesiveness which singles them out as a separate nationality among European nations. The truth, therefore, is, not that the creation of the Kingdom of Italy has called an Italian nationality into being, but, on the contrary, that the consciousness of a common national bond has made the rise of this new political state possible, and opened up the prospect of still further development.

A still more interesting case in point is presented by the Germans. According to the view that nationality and political consolidation are identical, there could hardly be any

talk of the existence of a German nation until King William of Prussia was crowned Emperor of Germany in 1871. The real imperial unity of Germany had vanished centuries before. Ever since the breaking up of the great Western Empire, the political ties which had previously bound the numerous German states by a common allegiance became more and more weakened; and during the greater portion of the interval between the dissolution of the old bonds and the re-constitution of the state by the revival of imperial rule, the constituent states maintained conditions of more or less complete independence towards each other. Even the attempt at a final settlement made in 1815, after Buonaparte's overthrow, resulted in a confederation of a very lax and almost nominal character. Some progress was made towards political unity by the Zollverein; but it was not till the formation of the North German Confederation, in 1866, that the union of Germany began to take material shape by means of a common constitution and representative assembly.

But all this time one never hears of a Prussian nation, a Hanoverian nation, or a Bavarian nation; whereas the conception of a distinct German nation steadily pervades this whole stretch of history, never becoming submerged by its vicissitudes, always standing out clearly from the mists of uncertainty that surround many of its phases. Clearly, then, political independence does not confer a separate nationality; for national feeling often overrides political boundaries, and obliterates mechanical lines of division. The utmost that can be said is that, where this national feeling exists, a tendency towards political consolidation may frequently be traced; but it is likewise true that the tendency may be permanently held in check by the play of other and more weighty forces.

3. The third principle which it is proposed to set up as

a basis for the classification of nations is the principle of race. There is no hypothesis more commonly entertained by superficial writers than that the nationality of a group of men is determined by their common descent. It is admitted, as indeed it must be by even the least observant, that there may be modifying circumstances which somewhat qualify the universality of the law, but it is usually supposed that in the main, and as a general statement, the national bond is formed out of ties of blood.

But however closely such a definition may have been adapted to the conditions of a primitive age, as applied to the composition of modern nations, it is in direct contradiction to the facts of history. Originally, no doubt, a nation was an alliance of consanguineous tribes, and each tribe was simply an extension of the family. But with the successive migrations of Celts, Greeks, Teutons, and Slaves—with the constant pressure of new hordes of invaders upon the populations settled on the land—the old primitive relations were fundamentally changed, and in the gradual and, in a certain sense, arbitrary classification of populations into the various nations such as we now know them, race has played no part whatever—or, at all events, a part so subordinate and insignificant as to afford no guidance in an investigation into the connotation of the term Nationality.

It is strange how the belief in a racial foundation for the division of nations persists, in defiance of the clear statements of history. The theory assumes that if you were to divide men into groups, larger and smaller, in the same manner as animals and plants are classified in the science of natural history, you would arrive at a point in your classification at which the groups so obtained would be co-incident with the nations of the world. Yet is not this assumption manifestly untrue? Animals and plants are grouped into species, and families, and varieties, according to their degrees

of likeness. By these outward marks of similarity, their origin, their descent is decided, and their classification is effected. Suppose the same system of division applied to the human race—the classification would naturally be a genealogical one. It would start from a single family, and widen more and more as it recognised a remoter degree of relationship, and hence took in a larger number of persons able to claim a common descent. It is evident that you could go on widening the circle indefinitely, but no single group that could thus be embraced would be equivalent to a nation, simply because modern nations are the result of an incessant intermingling of these groups, and a constant shuffling and confusion of the elements composing them.

There may, perhaps, be some Oriental nations which consist solely of individuals possessing a common descent—though this is open to very grave doubt—but at all events every European nation is an example of the fact that descent is no conclusive mark of nationality. On the one hand we find that not all having the same descent belong to one nation, and on the other, in every nation we find individuals of different descent. “Ethnographical considerations,” as M. Rénan says, “went for nothing in the constitution of the modern nations. France is Celtic, Iberian, German. Germany is German, Celtic and Slavonian. Italy is the country where ethnography is most embarrassed. Gallic, Etruscan, Pelasgian, Greek, without speaking of many other elements, cross each other in the most inextricable medley. The British Isles in their entirety offer a mixture of Celtic and German blood, of which the proportions are singularly difficult to determine.” As an example of sections of the same race belonging to different nations, I might instance the Flemish, who are of German extraction, but who would by no means consent to form part of the German nation.

But perhaps we are to understand by the race-theory,

not that a whole nation belongs to one race, but that the overwhelming majority does. This is, indeed, what its defenders assert. The fact of the intermingling of races cannot be controverted, but we are often told that the main stream of a nation's history may be traced along the lines of a common descent; that those who form the backbone of a nation's strength, who have created its genius, who have constructed and perfected its political machinery: these are men in whose veins flows the same blood, and who are welded together by sympathies which take their rise from a consciousness of close kinship. Every nation has the characteristics of some particular race broadly stamped upon its life and history, bears the evidence of its racial descent in its thought, customs, and institutions.

In order to test the accuracy of this position, let us take a rapid glance at the proportion in which the various racial elements of the English nation stand towards each other. In the passage just quoted, Rénan talks of the difficulty of determining that proportion in respect of the inhabitants of the British Isles. The British Isles, however, are peopled by three, if not four nations. For the sake of simplifying the subject we will exclude the Scotch, Irish, and Welsh from the problem, and turn our attention only to the English; and we will endeavour to discover what is to be said with respect to the descent of the vast preponderating mass of the English nation.

To the question, Which of the great races of Europe may claim the English as its own? the ordinary manual of English History answers with no uncertain voice. The English are a Teutonic people. Historians of no mean authority teach this doctrine in unhesitating terms; school-boys learn it from their primers, and most people accept it without question. Men like Freeman, Kingsley, and Green are never tired of lauding to the skies the Teutonic qualities

of Englishmen; and when any of Briton's sons distinguish themselves by brilliant achievements, either on the battle-field or in the arts of peace, it is invariably their Teutonic courage, their Teutonic energy, or their Teutonic keenness of intellect that is credited with the triumph. The strongest reasons exist, however, for calling the assertion into question. If we are to place reliance upon the results of those who have patiently and exhaustively studied the ethnology of the people of England on the one hand, and all the evidence in favour of the alleged Teutonism of the English people on the other, we shall be forced to the conclusion that it is quite untrue that Teutonic blood predominates in this country in anything like the degree that is claimed—if, indeed, it predominates at all.

The common story of the subjugation of the ancient Celtic inhabitants of Britain by the Angles and Saxons need not be here repeated in detail. It is asserted that these Teutonic invaders poured into these shores in a series of small expeditions which rapidly succeeded each other; that they gave battle to the native Celts, whom they speedily vanquished; that the latter were thoroughly routed at all points and slaughtered in large quantities; that most of those who survived were driven into the extreme west and south-west of the island, into Cumberland, Wales, and Cornwall; and that an insignificant few, who remained behind, became the slaves of the new-comers, who took possession of the country and permanently occupied it. It is these Anglo Saxon invaders, it is maintained, that form the true progenitors of the English nation. A large and important admixture of foreign blood was undoubtedly effected soon afterwards through the incursions of the Scandinavians, who settled in considerable numbers in the north-east portions of the island; but as these Northmen were likewise Teutonic in race, the fact of their coming only adds to the strength of

the popular theory regarding the descent of the English people.

It will be seen that the truth of this theory rests entirely on the probability of the received account of the extermination of the ancient Britons by the Anglo-Saxons, and the gradual colonization, by the latter, of the whole of the country. But the more that account is subjected to the keen analysis of the impartial critic, the less likely does it appear to have been a true record of what actually took place. Broadly speaking, there are two sources for the belief that the Britons were completely dispossessed of their territories, and that, practically speaking, they may be neglected, in tracing the history of the English nation. Those sources are: first, the traditions handed down by the old historians; secondly, the evidence constantly afforded by the English language.

With regard to the first of these data, it is acknowledged that all the old accounts of the Anglo-Saxon invasion of Britain are either copies or amplifications of one original statement. That statement is furnished by a monk named Gildas, who wrote in Wales about the year 560, and who gives what professes to be a circumstantial description of the landing of the Teutonic invaders, and their successive conquests. Now, it has been shewn by Mr. Pike, in his book, *The English, and their Origin*, as well as by other writers, that the testimony of Gildas is, unless supported by corroborative evidence, almost worthless. His statements on other points are utterly untrustworthy; his work is meagre in fact, copious in words, and stuffed with sounding epithets, and, moreover, he did not write with the object of giving us the historical facts of the conquest. The conclusion therefore is, that the testimony of tradition is quite insufficient in itself to support the commonly accepted notion of the extermination of the Britons; and the question arises, Is

there any confirmatory evidence? The reply usually given is, Yes, the required additional support *is* forthcoming; it is to be found in the testimony of language. The basis of the English language is undoubtedly Anglo-Saxon; the language spoken to-day in England is a historical development of the tongue spoken by the Teutonic invaders of Britain; and it is this fact that has hitherto been relied upon as confirming the voice of tradition, and as forming the salient justification of the theory that the English are in the main a Teutonic people.

But the principle—once regarded as a fundamental law in the science of ethnology—that language is a criterion of race, has been completely surrendered by the later ethnologists. It has been shewn that instances are not rare of a whole people giving up their original tongue and adopting a foreign language. Professor Huxley\* quotes the example of the Feegeans, whose physical peculiarities prove their intimate relationship with their neighbours the Negritos of New Caledonia, but who, nevertheless, speak a Polynesian language. Coming nearer home, we see in France how the ancient languages once spoken by the Belgæ, Celtæ, and Aquitani of Cæsar's time, have almost entirely disappeared. One set of invaders from the north compelled those peoples to adopt a Teutonic name, while another set from the south-east gradually imposed on them a new language. Yet how false to history and fact would be the inference that, because the French people speak a Latin language, "this population was essentially and fundamentally a 'Latin' race which had some communication with the Celts." "Community of language," says Huxley, "testifies to close contact between the people who speak the language, but to nothing else; philology has absolutely nothing to do with ethnology,

\* "Methods and Results of Ethnology," in his *Critiques and Addresses*, p. 141.

except in so far as it suggests the existence or absence of such contact. The contrary assumption, that language is the test of race, has introduced the utmost confusion into ethnological speculation, and has nowhere worked greater scientific and practical mischief than in the ethnology of the British Islands." In the same essay, he says that the fact of the Teutonic English being now spoken throughout Britain "affords not the slightest justification for the common practice of speaking of the present inhabitants of Britain as an 'Anglo-Saxon' people."

There is no valid evidence in favour of the common story of the slaughter and expulsion of the Britons; it is preposterous on the face of it; there is no instance of such a wholesale suppression of a people in the whole range of history, except where the conquerors are so vastly superior in civilization and resource to the conquered as, for instance, the English to the aborigines of Australia; and it is far easier to suppose that the Saxons forced the conquered to adopt their language, than to suppose that they succeeded in butchering or driving forth a people, of whom all the accounts tell us that they were courageous and brave. And this view of the survival of the Britons, and their intermingling with the Saxon conquerors, which is *prima facie* the more reasonable one, obtains the strongest confirmation from a comparison between the physical attributes of modern Englishmen and those of the various ancient peoples who are known to have taken up their residence in these islands at different times: the Britons, the Saxons, the Scandinavians, and afterwards the Norman-French. The purely zoological method of inquiry is the only safe guide in ethnology; the measurements of the skull, the colour of the hair and iris, the general physical build, are the only sure external indications of descent; and we are indebted to Dr. Beddoe for having published in his work, *The Races of Britain*, a perfectly

astounding mass of facts on these important points, which constitute the only solid foundation on which a theory of the descent of Englishmen can be based. This author is opposed to the conclusions of some previous writers who maintained that the total addition to the inhabitants of the country through the Anglo-Saxon conquest only reached an insignificant proportion of the whole population, and that, therefore, Celtic and not Anglo-Saxon blood vastly predominates in the English nation; but the results of his exhaustive enquiry are no less opposed to the accepted belief in the preponderating Teutonism of the English. His general conclusion is, that in some parts of the east and north, Anglo-Saxon or Scandanavian blood predominates, and that in the greater part of England it amounts to something like half.

I have indulged in a somewhat lengthy digression, but it was necessary in order to settle the point at issue, and it has served its purpose. It has been shown that the test of race, as a determining mark of nationality, however widely or however narrowly it be applied, absolutely fails. Who is the typical modern Englishman? Is he a Celt or a Teuton? Is he a Briton, a Saxon, a Norseman, a Dane, or a Norman? He is the result of a mixture of all. There is hardly an Englishman living who can trace his descent (both paternal and maternal) ten generations back; and if he could construct a genealogical chart, would he not be hopelessly at a loss to vouch for the racial affinity of the hundreds of forefathers appearing in it whose blood flows in his veins? The same considerations apply with more or less exactness to most of the European nations, and in a superlative degree to the American nation; the races have become inextricably mixed, and the influence of race distinctions upon the formation and segregation of nations has been strangely exaggerated. The Germans are called a Teutonic

people, but probably they are one-third Slavonic. In what family the French are to be included it is impossible to say, so confused and jumbled are the many elements out of which the nation has been evolved.

We must, then, dismiss the idea that we can expect to find a key to the meaning of nationality from a study of the races of mankind. Ethnology, strictly speaking, hardly takes us further than the point where the movements out of which the modern nations slowly emerged, began. As a department of anthropology, it is a science of infinite value and interest; but it furnishes no results which supply a basis for the classification of nations and for framing a theory of nationality.

4. It remains to inquire whether we may discover such a basis in the element of language. Language, as we have seen, is no test of race; but it does not follow from this that language cannot be the distinguishing mark of nationality, because, as we have also learned, race and nationality represent ideas quite independent of each other. Yet a moment's consideration will show that language, too, fails to satisfy the conditions of the problem. For if it were the required standard, we should have all the individuals of a nation speaking the same language, and no language spoken by more than one nation. Yet neither of these propositions is true. The Swiss speak three or four different languages, and they are one of the most compact and united of nations. Among the Belgians, both French and Flemish are widely spoken. The Scotch include a vast number of people who cannot speak a word of Gaelic, and perhaps not a few who speak Gaelic only, yet both classes would repudiate the insinuation that they do not belong to the Scotch nation. On the other hand, the people of the United States and the English use the same tongue, but form separate nations; and similarly the Spanish speaking populations of South

America are of a different nationality from the people of Spain. The same remark applies in the case of language as was made with respect to political combination. There are no doubt cases where the employment of a common language indicates that the speakers are united by the national bond; but this is very far from being universally the case. And the most that can be said is that a tendency exists among the individuals of a nation to adopt the same speech as a method of closer communication; but conditions frequently subsist, which counteract that inclination and prevent its practical operation.

The results which have been arrived at by the foregoing inquiry are purely negative. We have succeeded in demonstrating what nationality is not; but little progress, it may be thought, has been made towards establishing any positive definition. But in reality an examination of the hypotheses floating on the surface of current literature, and taken for granted in the common thought of the day, was absolutely necessary for a thorough investigation of the problem. It will soon be evident that a principle is yielded by a discussion of these assumptions, which leads naturally to the framing of an answer to the question, conformable alike with reason and fact.

It is plain that, before the dawn of history, when mankind were still in a primitive state, any one of the criteria which have been discussed, might have stood as a valid test of nationality. It is doubtful, perhaps, whether the term "nation," in any conceivable sense, can rightly be applied to any section of the human race, as the race existed under the conditions of the remote past. But assuming that it can, the nationality of such a group might be expressed indifferently in terms of geography (both physical and political), ethnology or philology. A nation, if it was anything, was an

aggregation of individuals, occupying the same territory, acknowledging the same head, sprung from the same race, speaking the same language. We might add several other distinguishing marks of which the same might be said, yet equally inapplicable to the altered conditions of modern times; such as religion, manners and customs, political institutions. Before man had discovered his power to master and set at defiance the forces and barriers of physical nature, any one of these tests would have sufficed. But so soon as we cross the threshold of history, we perceive all these conditions changing and giving way to others. History is largely the record of these revolutions. And here we touch the core of the problem. For what is history? It is the expression of the will of man. The will of man—that inner force of the human mind, which so often works in opposition to the restraints and limitations of physical nature; this it is that has made history, and that has called the modern nations into existence. Geography, ethnology, and even for the most part philology, are sciences which investigate conditions as they are, rather than those which have been brought about by the conscious, purposive action of the race. They all deal with physical characteristics. But there is something higher, more powerful than them all; it is the will of man.

We hence perceive the fallacy underlying any attempt to define nationality by physical marks or attributes. Our problem is not a physical one, it is a psychological one; we have to deal not with objective marks of likeness, but with subjective ones. The tie that holds the members of a nation together is a subtle, invisible, spiritual bond, woven out of the innumerable threads of individual feelings and desires, which will not always be dictated to by physical differences. The true nature and essence of nationality can only be understood when viewed from this standpoint. "Into the

natural distribution of the human species,"\* says Professor Lazarus, one of the foremost philosophers of Germany, "according to races, larger and smaller groups, stocks, federations of families, and families, there enters the human spirit, freedom, history. By this interference, things naturally combined are separated; things naturally separate are mixed, or are assimilated to each other. Spiritual affinity and diversity is therefore independent of genealogical. It is on this encroachment of the spiritual (*geistig*), historical relations upon the differences marked out by nature, that the conception of nation is founded; and that which makes a nation what it is, lies essentially not so much in certain objective conditions, such as descent, language, etc., regarded as such, but in reality only in the subjective opinion of the members of the nation, who all agree with each other to regard themselves as a nation. The idea of a nation rests upon the subjective opinion of the members of the nation themselves about themselves, about their likeness and cohesion. If animals and plants are to be dealt with, it is the natural historian who decides what species they belong to, according to their objective characteristics; in the case of man, however, we ask him to what nation he belongs. Race and descent can also, in the case of man, be decided objectively; but a man fixes upon his own nation, from subjective considerations."

Broadly speaking, then, we come to this conclusion: that the nationality of a man depends upon his own will; he belongs to the nation which he instinctively or deliberately recognizes as his. A nation is a group of individuals who are alike suffused by what can only be described as a kind of corporate soul—that inspiring influence which we call national feeling. Paradoxical as it may sound, it is still not a mere empty truism to say that a nation is a section of

\* *Was heisst National?* Berlin, 1880. p. 12.

mankind, pervaded by a common national feeling ; for it is this national feeling which calls the nation into being, not the nation which creates national feeling. This impalpable, immaterial influence is the only mark which will serve as a universal criterion for the classification of nations. Directly we introduce a physical attribute, it is speedily discovered that there are exceptional cases to which it does not apply. And the reason for this is obvious. The human species is differently affected and influenced in different circumstances. Though marching triumphantly over the obstacles of physical nature, the human will is never entirely uninfluenced by external conditions. The latter always enter to some extent into every problem which the volition of man sets itself to solve ; but according as these external conditions vary, the decisions of men may not impossibly differ. National feeling, therefore, is not always the resultant of the same complication of forces, or at all events, not of the same forces acting in the same proportion of strength. Gustav Rümelin, Chancellor of the University of Tübingen, who, in an address delivered in 1872, arrives at the same conclusion regarding the concept nation as is here set forth, remarks with truth :—"The origin of most of the nations lies in a dark foretime which is beyond the reach of our research ; but even where it can be illumined with historic testimony, we are only told how these definite conditions sprang into existence ; the foundation on which the formation of nations rests is taken for granted. This can only lie in the natural characteristics and endowments of the human species, and must be shown not by the historian, but by the psychologist."

We can hence understand how it comes to pass that in different nations, the common corporate will, which always forms the basis of its nationality, may, nevertheless, express itself in different forms ; and yet why no single such expres-

sion will serve as a distinguishing mark for all other cases as well as its own. In one instance, national feeling may take the form of love for political autonomy; in another, it may express itself in loyalty to historic territory; and in a third, it may be identical with the devotion to one particular language. Richard Bœckh contributed to the *Zeitschrift für Völkerpsychologie und Sprachwissenschaft* of 1866, a learned and searching essay entitled, "The Statistical Importance of the Popular Tongue as a Mark of Nationality," in which he contends that the genius of a nation—its thought, its activity, its culture—finds universal expression in its language. He hence concludes that it is language that constitutes the characteristic sign of nationality. But Bœckh fixed his attention chiefly on the national feeling of the Germans. It may be true in the special case of that people, or may have been twenty years ago, that language forms the ideal standard round which all sections of the nation rally, and which they therefore regard as the crucial test for deciding who are and who are not Germans. But as a basis for defining national feeling in general, the test, as we have seen, signally fails. It is contradicted by the Swiss, who, in spite of their linguistic differences, maintain their national feeling at a high level; it is contradicted by the Americans, who have not been prevented by their community of language with the English from developing a separate national feeling of their own.

Rénan,\* in his solution of the problem of nationality, comes to a conclusion in substantial, though not complete, agreement with the view I have endeavoured to set forth. He says: "A nation is a soul, a spiritual principle. Two things, which to say truth only make one, constitute this soul, this spiritual principle. One is in the past, the other in the present. The one is the possession of a rich legacy of

\* *Qu'est ce qu'une Nation*, p. 26.

memories ; the other is actual agreement in the present, the desire to live together, the wish to continue to make that heritage valuable which one has received undivided. . . . To have common glories in the past, a common will in the present ; to have accomplished great things together, to wish to do so again : here is the essential condition for being a people." True as this view is on the whole, it errs through not taking into account the many inducements that sometimes weigh with individuals, and more rarely, but not impossibly, with a whole people, to gradually adopt a new nationality. Rümelin goes to the root of the matter when he says, "Human freedom stands above all these single powers of attraction ; it is possible for me to tear myself away from everything, and to go to strangers and say, with King David's ancestress, 'thy people shall be my people, and thy God shall be my God.' The conception of nation is not strictly circumscribed by objective marks, it demands also subjective perception. My nation is that which I regard as mine, the people whom I call my own, with whom I feel myself bound by indissoluble bonds. And here a division, a schism of feelings, is possible ; one motive may draw me to this circle, another to that ; faith may direct me to one group, from which the tie of community, of state, or of descent severs me. But our soul always feels and deplores every such division and brokenness of inclination as a trouble ; it will always be accompanied by a silent longing for a full, united community of life. There will always be hovering before it that central group which embraces all the aims of life ; the group in which all the single motives that lead to human grouping find their point of contact ; the group of which we have the full consciousness : these are our own, among whose adherents we stand, towards whom we are constant, whose fate we share, from whom to separate were an unbearable thought."

Finally, a word must be said as regards the application of the principles here maintained to individual instances. It follows, from the considerations set forth, that only in a very few cases can there be any doubt as to whether a given group is entitled to be regarded as possessing a distinct nationality. Where an individual national consciousness finds clear and general expression, where the determination to be a nation is vigorous and powerful, all that is absolutely indispensable to constitute a nation is present, be the grounds of the determination what they may. There can thus only arise a doubt with respect to a group among whom that consciousness is vague or flickering—where the will is feeble and intermittent. Such an uncertainty betokens either of two things. Either it is a sign that a new nation is about to spring into existence, that new germs of life are slowly developing, and are about to cast themselves adrift from the old life in the midst of which they had their origin; or it is the premonitory symptom of the disappearance of a nation, the sign that the people composing it have lost the *raison d'être* of their national individuality, and are content to merge themselves in some larger group with which they have formed profound sympathies.

We thus see that the national cohesion and independence of a group of people are conditions which rest upon their own common consciousness, and that, in the case of an individual attaching himself to a nation, his nationality is determined by his own consciousness, which must in the end be identical with the consciousness of the nation. And the fact that this consciousness, this national feeling may, in different nations, manifest itself in different ways, suggests the belief that the nations of the world are, as it were, counterparts of each other; that each is, in a psychological as well as in a physical sense, the complement of the rest, in the great kingdom of the human race. The fact of

national unity brings into prominence the social yearnings of men; the forces of combination by which they are governed. But it likewise accentuates the differences by which men are necessarily separated; the lines of demarcation which inevitably keep them apart. If it be asked whether national feeling is a noble or ignoble sentiment, it can only be replied that a larger view of the mutual relations of nationalities discloses the truth that these unavoidable separations may subserve a high and noble purpose. Economists tell us that division of labour is an essential condition of our developed life; a necessity of modern civilisation. The individual working for his own hand finds that all the time he has also been working for others, contributing some portion to the common task, without which that task would be incomplete. The same law pervades the varied energies and aims of nations. Each nation, if it seeks to fulfil its true destiny, labours at some portion of the gigantic machine by which the work of humanity is carried on. "By their diverse faculties, often opposed, the nations perform the common work of civilization; all bring forth a note to this grand concert of humanity which, in effect, is the highest ideal reality which we can attain." I say, "if each seek to fulfil its true destiny." The story is told of a mountaineer, that once climbing an Alpine mountain on a misty day, he beheld what seemed to be a monster looming ahead of him in the distance. Nothing daunted, he persevered in his ascent, and as he drew nearer perceived that what he had mistaken for an apparition was the figure of a man. At last coming quite close to the spot, he found that the object of his gaze was his own brother.

We may hope that a like experience may mark the advance of the nations along the path of civilization. The time has hardly yet come to an end when each nation,

peering vainly through the thick mists of bigotry and distrust, regarded the people of the surrounding nations as monsters, whom it was its business to attack, to crush, to deprive of power and vitality. Slowly the more enlightened nations are beginning to realize that the ends of humanity may be served by a better method than by the brutal inhuman system of warfare and bloodshed; they have advanced nearer to their neighbours, and find that the latter are, like themselves, men, with the same faculties, the same aspirations, the same obligations. But at the risk of being deemed visionaries, let us indulge in the dream that some day, though it be in the dim and distant future, the distance between nation and nation may be still more shortened, the dividing lines be still more effectually obliterated; and that the time may come when the men of all nations will discover that they are brothers—brothers by reason of the sacred kinship of their common humanity, brothers in right of their common membership of the great “Parliament of man, the Federation of the world.”

**ALPHABETICAL LIST OF MEMBERS.**



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ALPHABETICALLY, WITH THEIR ADDRESSES AND  
DATES OF ELECTION.

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- 1868 Right Hon. Viscount Sherbrooke, 84, *Lowndes-square,*  
*London, S.W.*  
1886 Dr. Oliver Wendell Holmes, *Cambridge, Boston, U.S.A.*  
1889 J. Russell Lowell, *Cambridge, Boston, U.S.A.*  
1889 His Honour Judge Hughes, *Q.C., Chester.*

**Ordinary Members.**

- 1887 Abraham, T. Fell, 87, *Bold Street.*  
1887 Aldrich, Charles, Junr., *Tarbock Road, Huyton.*  
1872 Alsop, J. W., B.A. (Harvey, Alsop & Stevens), 14, *Castle-*  
*street.*  
1887 Aspinall, Clarke, J.P. (City Coroner), *Liverpool.*  
1888 Badger, H. S. (H. C. Reynolds), 21, *Freeson's-row.*  
1859 Bailey, Dr. F. J., 51, *Grove-street.*  
1881 Baker, R. H., *Elmsvale, Gateacre.*  
1872 Ball, George Henry, 15, *Gambier Terrace.*  
1882 Banister, H. C. (Jas. Muspratt & Sons), *Dale-street.*  
1888 Bank, A. R., LL.D., 13, *Union-court.*  
1885 Bankier, T. H. (Sam. Johnston & Co.), *Mersey Chambers.*  
1888 Banner, J. S. H. (H. Banner & Son), 24, *North John-street.*  
1886 Barker, Samuel, 136, *Upper Parliament-street.*  
1855 Barrow, J., 7, *Beach Lawn, Waterloo.*  
1880 Baxter, Chas. H., 2, *Molyneux Place, Water-street.*

- 1888 Beckett, D. L., *Carlton-buildings*, 8, *Rumford-street*.  
 1888 Beckett, James, *Carlton-buildings*, 8, *Rumford-street*.  
 1880 Bell, Henry, *Union Bank*, *Brunswick-street*.  
 1878 Bell, Miles (J. R. Pattinson), 19, *Manchester-buildings*.  
 1888 Bell, Thos. 5, *Chapel-street*.  
 1871 Bellman, George, *Esk Villa*, *Old Swan*:  
 1876 Benas, A. L., 1, *Lord-street*.  
 1871 Benas, B. L., J.P., 1, *Lord-street*.  
 1875 Benas, P. A., 1, *Lord-street*.  
 1874 Bennett, Wm., *St. George's Place*, *Lime-street*.  
 1886 Bewsher, T. B. (Leyland & Bullins), *King-street*.  
 1878 Bindloss, Edward W. (J. Williams & Co.), *Orange Court*,  
*Castle-street*.  
 1876 Birch, J. H. (McDiarmid, Greenshields & Co.), *Seaton-*  
*buildings*, 17, *Water-street*.  
 1870 Birchall, James, *Industrial Schools*, *Kirkdale*.  
 1878 Blackwood, J., 16, *Oil-street*.  
 1888 Blood, Fred. W., 66, *Grafton-street*.  
 1874 Blood, Wm., 47, *Hamilton-square*, *Birkenhead*.  
 1878 Boston, Wm. M. (Ralli Brothers), *Mellor's-buildings*, 80,  
*Exchange-street East*.  
 1886 Boumphrey, E. J., *Lance-lane*, *Wavertree*.  
 1887 Bower, Frank, 5, *Grove-road*, *Fairfield*.  
 1888 Bradley, Prof. A. C., M.A., *University College*.  
 1880 Bright, Alfred, M.A. (Bateson & Co.), 14, *Castle-street*.  
 1879 Broadbridge, Fredk. 25, *Lord-street*.  
 1875 Broadbridge, George, 4, *Rumford Place*.  
 1886 Brodrick, Alan H., 28B, *Liverpool and London Chambers*.  
 1885 Bromfield, John C., *Government-buildings*, *Victoria-street*.  
 1877 Brunner, Joseph P., 28, *Exchange-street East*.  
 1888 Bullen, Wm., Junr., 19, *South John-street*.  
 1880 Burton, James, M.A., 100, *Mulgrave-street*.  
 1886 Butters, W. B. (Twigge & Butters), 19, *Stanley-street*.  
 1884 Buxton, Thomas, 40, *Shrewsbury-road*, *Oaton*.  
 1884 Callister, E. F., 18, *Temple-street*.  
 1884 Cannington, A. K., *Exchange-chambers*, *Bixteth-street*.

- 1882 Carter, Dr. Wm., 74, *Rodney-street.*
- 1878 Casson, Robert, 17A, *Sweeting-street.*
- 1878 Clarkson, Thos., 40, *Sydenham Avenue, Sefton Park.*
- 1884 Cleaver, Harris P., *Devonshire-road, Prince's Park.*
- 1876 Coates, Wm. Henry, 21, *Victoria-street.*
- 1869 Coghill, Alexander, 19, *Breeze Hill, Walton.*
- 1882 Coghill, Alexander, Junr. (Coghill & James), 18, *Rumford-street.*
- 1881 Cohen, L. S., *Ethelstone, Alexandra Drive.*
- 1886 Coke, Henry (Sassoon & Co.), *Rumford-street.*
- 1881 Conning, J., Junr., 18, *Chapel-street.*
- 1876 Coppel, David B., 68, *Rodney-street.*
- 1881 Cornett, Alfred (Goffey, North & Co.), 15, *Lord-street.*
- 1882 Cornish, Edward, 60, *Castle-street.*
- 1879 Crooke, R., Junr., *Orange Court, Castle-street.*
- 1888 Crooks, J. Kirke (R. Crooks & Co.), 21, *Water-street.*
- 1884 Crosfield, Henry C., 53, *Fern Grove, Lodge-lane.*
- 1856 Crosfield, Wm., J.P., 6, *Stanley-street.*
- 1877 Cross, Samuel (Thames and Mersey Insurance Co.),  
*Liverpool and London Chambers.*
- 1876 Currie, John (Bank of Liverpool), *Water-street.*
- 1878 Danger, William, *Central Buildings, North John-street.*
- 1881 Danson, F. C., *Liverpool and London Chambers.*
- 1889 Davies, John, B.A., LL.B. (British and Foreign Marine  
Insurance Co.), *Exchange buildings.*
- 1876 Davis, Richard H., 166, *Upper Parliament-street.*
- 1879 Davison, W. H., 8, *Sefton-street.*
- 1881 Davy, W. (Elder, Dempster & Co.), *Castle-street.*
- 1884 Dawbarn, C. Y. C., M.A., *Merelands, Blundellsands.*
- 1888 Deciani Vittorio (Vice-Consul for Italy), *Liverpool.*
- 1876 Decker, H. (A. & G. Chludow & Co.), *The Temple, Dale-street.*
- 1881 Deuchar, P. B., 17, *Kingsley-road.*
- 1887 Dobell, Oswald, *Wheat Hill, Gateacre.*
- 1888 Doughan, Jas. A. (Perry, Bury & Co.), *Batavia-buildings,  
12, Hackins Hey.*

- 1888 Dun, John (Parr's Banking Co.), *Liverpool*.  
 1877 Dwerryhouse, Wm., *Peter's-buildings, 18, Rumford-street*.  
 1887 Eaton, C. J., 44, *Canning-street*.  
 1875 Easton, Thomas D. (Macfie & Son), *Moorfields*.  
 1851 Edwards, E. E., 4, *Chapel-street*.  
 1885 Edwards, Fred. W., *Fairhope, Victoria Park, Walton-on-the-Hill*.  
 1888 Edwards, John, Junr., 282, *Upper Parliament-street*.  
 1881 Eglen, J. P. (Hutton & Co.), *The Temple, Dale-street*.  
 1868 Elliott, John (Urmson & Elliott), 85, *Peter's-lane*.  
 1880 Ellis, Charles R., *Fair View, Trafalgar, Bebington*.  
 1882 Ellison, J. F. (Ralli & Psicha), *Brunswick-street*.  
 1884 Ellison, Wm. Stanley, 62, *Dale-street*.  
 1877 Evans, Wm., *Canada-buildings, Canada Dock*.  
 1874 Farmer, J. H., 8, *Rumford-place*.  
 1869 Finney, C. F., 12, *St. George's Crescent*.  
 1888 Finney, James, *Beresford-road, Oxtou*.  
 1862 Forwood, A. B., J.P., M.P., *Queen's-buildings, 11, Dale-st.*  
 1859 Forwood, Sir W. B., J.P., 11, *Dale-street*.  
 1874 Frost, J. P., 9, *Comely-bank, Egremont*.  
 1884 Gair, Angus Wm. (Rathbone Bros. & Co.), 21, *Water-street*.  
 1879 Gardner, Richard Barnes, 21, *The Albany*.  
 1886 Gibson, Ernest, B.A., LL.B., 4, *Harrington-street*.  
 1871 Gillies, Archibald, 27, *The Temple, Dale-street*.  
 1875 Gollin, Lionel, 56, *South Castle-street*.  
 1884 Goodyear, Jas. H., 81, *James-street*.  
 1888 Gorst, W. L., *Old Hall-street*.  
 1877 Graves, A. S. (African Merchants' Co.), 18, *Rumford-street*.  
 1884 Greer, F. A., M.A., 11B, *Lord-street*.  
 1888 Greer, A., *Bentinck-street*.  
 1884 Gregson, Jos. (Slack, Ashcroft & Co.), 4, *Paul-street*.  
 1876 Grindley, Edward, *Church-street*.  
 1880 Gunton, George R. (F. Braby & Co. Lim.), *Hatton Garden*.  
 1854 Hakes, James, M.R.C.S., *Latrigg, Aigburth-road*.  
 1879 Halsall, William, *Clerks' Association, 87, Victoria-street*.

- 1881 Hampshire, F. A., *Victoria-buildings, 24, Hackins Hey.*
- 1861 Hampshire, H. J., *Victoria-buildings, 24, Hackins Hey.*
- 1886 Hampson, R. A., *Walmer-buildings, 6, Water-street.*
- 1889 Hand, J., *Liver Court, Tithebarn-street.*
- 1872 Hance, E.M., LL.B., L.C.P., *Municipal Offices, Dale-street.*
- 1882 Handley, James, J.P., *Holly Bank, Garston.*
- 1876 Hanmer, Thomas, *Sailors' Home.*
- 1888 Hardy, O. H., M.A., *Lord-street.*
- 1876 Hargreaves, John P., M.A. (H. Hargreaves & Son), 1, *Lower Castle-street.*
- 1885 Harrower, T. G., 12, *Paradise-street.*
- 1881 Hartley, F., 26, *Castle-street.*
- 1884 Harvey, C. W., *Apsley Villa, Wellington-road, Oxtou.*
- 1879 Hess, Joseph (Parkinson & Hess), *Imperial Chambers, 62, Dale-street.*
- 1873 Hetherington, J. P., *Adelphi Bank, South John-street.*
- 1887 Higgins, Walter, 11, *Dale-street.*
- 1884 Hilton, B. H. (Crown Assurance Co.), 4, *Dod's-buildings, 6, Chapel-street.*
- 1876 Holland, E. S., 45, *Drury-buildings, 21, Water-street.*
- 1886 Holme, Herbert J., 3, *India-buildings, Water-street.*
- 1872 Horne, James, 20, *Redcross-street.*
- 1885 Howarth, Mark, 7, *Breckside Park, Anfield.*
- 1882 Hudson, R. W., B.A., *Bank Hall, Liverpool.*
- 1884 Hughes, John, Junr. (North & South Wales Bank Limited), *Castle-street.*
- 1887 Hughes, T. Smythe (John Rew & Co.), *Brown's-buildings.*
- 1886 Hughes, Geo., *North-Western Bank, 4, Commutation Row.*
- 1882 Hulme, Robert, 18, *Chapel-street.*
- 1881 Hunter, J. B. (J. Rew & Co.), *Brown's-buildings.*
- 1875 Huntingdon, Henry, 22, *Fenwick-street.*
- 1889 Inglis, A. G., 10, *Water-street.*
- 1884 Irlen, G. S., 6, *Huskisson-street.*
- 1879 Isaac, A. E., 61, *Bedford-street.*
- 1878 Ismay, T. H., J.P. (Ismay, Imrie & Co.), 10, *Water-street.*

- 1878 Jackson, Alfred M. (Penwarden & Jackson), *Apsley-buildings*, 4, *Old Hall-street*.
- 1871 Jackson, Robert (James Finlay & Co.), 4, *Chapel-street*.
- 1878 Jackson, W. L., *Queen Insurance-buildings*, 10, *Dale street*.
- 1875 Jackson, Wm. (G. S. Yates & Co.), 9, *Rumford Place*.
- 1882 James, Henry S. S. (Coghill & James), 18, *Rumford-street*.
- 1888 Jarvis, John, *Cressington Park*.
- 1888 Johanning, H. T. (H. Nash & Co.), 12, *Tower-buildings*, N., *Water-street*.
- 1881 Jones, Alfred L. (Elder, Dempster & Co.), *Castle-street*.
- 1888 Jones, A. Hughes, 21, *Bentley-road*.
- 1869 Jones, Morris P., 20, *Abercromby-square*.
- 1880 Jones, Robt. A., B.A., 4, *Harrington-street*.
- 1886 Jones, W. R. (Robertson, Cruikshank & Co.), C 4, *Exchange-buildings*.
- 1887 Jones, William (Medical Institution), *Hope-street*.
- 1888 Jude Simon, 7, *Sweeting-street*.
- 1879 Keet, C. H., 88, *Knowsley-buildings*, 15, *Tithebarn-street*.
- 1888 Keet, W. H., 7 & 8, *Royal Exchange*, *Leeds*.
- 1880 Kidman, James, M. A. (Thames & Mersey Marine Insurance Co.), *Liverpool and London-chambers*.
- 1880 Kitchingman, Joseph, 5, *Harrington-street*.
- 1884 Klombies, Robt., 28, *Chapel-street*.
- 1881 Kristmair, F. J. B., 95, *Hartington-road*, *Sefton Park*.
- 1887 Latham, Stanley A. (Welch & Parkinson), *Commerce Court*.
- 1888 Laurence, T. D., *Ravenshoe*, *Esh-road*, *Great Crosby*.
- 1868 Lee, T. L. (Lee & Nightingale), 15, *North John-street*.
- 1888 Leitch, Alex. E., 51, *Mulgrave-street*.
- 1881 Leslie, Frank John, F.R.G.S. (J. & H. Gregory & Leslie), 18, *Union-court*, *Castle-street*.
- 1887 Leslie, Charles, 9, *Parkway*.
- 1879 Levy, Philip Samuel, 24, *North John-street*.
- 1865 Lewis, A. H., *Mersey-chambers*, *Covent-garden*.
- 1884 Leyland, George R., H 19 & 20, *Exchange-buildings*.
- 1881 Lidstone, N. J., 19, *Castle-street*.

- 1888 Linton, Thos. (John Riley & Co.), *Victoria-street.*
- 1888 Lloyd, E. Lewis (Lowndes, Lloyd & Hilton), 8, *Brunswick-street.*
- 1876 Lloyd, Richard John, M.A. (R. Lloyd & Bro.), *Lombard-chambers, Bixteth street.*
- 1882 Lloyd, Wm. Henry (Ingleby, Lloyd & Co.), *Grosvenor-buildings, 11, Tithebarn-street.*
- 1881 Lott, E. C. G., *Commercial Bank, Castle-street.*
- 1884 Lowndes, Walter, *Liverpool and London Chambers.*
- 1881 Lyons, A., 19, *Canning Place.*
- 1886 Mackay, G. J., *Gradwell-street.*
- 1861 Maples, Thomas, 4A, *Exchange-buildings.*
- 1860 Marquis, R. (Macfie & Sons), *Moorfields.*
- 1888 Marquis, John, 18, *Victoria-street.*
- 1849 Marshall, W. B., J.P., 89, *Old Hall-street.*
- 1874 Marshall, W. B., Junr., 89, *Old Hall-street.*
- 1880 Massey, Chas. Wm., 25, *Water-street.*
- 1878 McCann, J. George, 21, *Water-street.*
- 1888 McCunn, Prof. J., M.A., *University College.*
- 1887 McLaren, Laurence, 2, *Dale-street.*
- 1881 McComb, J. (Liberal Association), 15, *Dale-street.*
- 1882 McConnell, Jno., 22, *Lord-street.*
- 1876 McCubbin, Hugh (Roberts, McCubbin & Co.), 11, *Orange Court, Castle-street.*
- 1876 McCulloch, D. B., 11, *Dale-street.*
- 1888 McCulloch, J. L. (Thames and Mersey Marine Insurance Co.), *Liverpool and London Chambers.*
- 1849 McDiarmid, John, *Seaton-buildings, 17, Water-street.*
- 1872 McFerran, George, 81, *Derwent-road, Stoneycroft.*
- 1882 McKenna, Jos. P., 7, *Union Court.*
- 1878 McNeil, Arthur (British & Foreign Marine Insurance Co.),  
A & B, *Exchange-buildings.*
- 1878 McPhail, T. R., 12, *Hackins Hey.*
- 1862 Melladew, J., 1, *Fenwick Court, Fenwick-street.*
- 1874 Meyer, Adolph, 20, *Fenwick-street.*
- 1881 Mill, C. G., 1, *Rumford Place.*

- 1888 Miller, Capt. A. T., S.S. "Conway," *Rock Ferry*.  
 1889 Moore, Henry F., *Brunswick-buildings, Fenwick-street*.  
 1885 Moorhouse, Alfred Piggott, *Freshfield-road, Formby*.  
 1878 Morgan, J. B., H 16, *Exchange-buildings*.  
 1887 Morris, Isaac, *Belvidere-road, Prince's Park*.  
 1888 Morrison, W. H., 27, *King-street*.  
 1887 Mort, F. H., 5, *Rose-lane, Mossley Hill*.  
 1879 Munn, J. Miller (Donald Currie & Co.), 25, *Castle-street*.  
 1857 Muspratt, E. K., J.P. (J. Muspratt & Sons), 81, *Dale-street*.  
 1881 Muzeen, T. H. B., *Church Villas, Lower Bebington*.  
 1878 Naylor, D., *Drury-lane*.  
 1882 Newton, A. W., M.A., 15, *Lord-street*.  
 1854 Nicholson, Richard, J.P., *Hesketh Park, Southport*.  
 1868 Nicholson, Robert, 11, *Harrington-street*.  
 1888 Niggerman, B., 6, *Irwell-chambers, 4, Fazakerley street*.  
 1884 Oakshott, T. W., J.P. (G. H. Lee & Co.), *Bazett-street*.  
 1861 Oulton, Wm., J.P., 22, *Preesons-row*.  
 1861 Owen, Peter (Farnworth & Jardine), 9, *Canada Dock*.  
 1878 Paton, A. B., *Knowsley-buildings, 15, Tithebarn-street*.  
 1860 Pemberton, John, 18, *Harrington-street*.  
 1882 Penny, Jno. (Henderson Bros.), *Water-street*.  
 1887 Phillips, R. Lloyd (West India & Pacific S.S. Co.),  
*The Temple*.  
 1876 Pierce, Henry G., B.A. (Gardner & Pierce), 1, *Fenwick-*  
*street*.  
 1887 Pierce, Ernest W. (Laces & Co.), *Union Court*.  
 1874 Pierce, Walter, 26, *Castle-street*.  
 1876 Pilkington, Lieut.-Col. J., *Sandown Park, Wavertree*.  
 1881 Polack, Rev. J., M.A., 176, *Upper Parliament-street*.  
 1881 Pollit, H. J. (Hampshire, Turner & Co.), 24, *Hackins-hey*.  
 1888 Powell, Richard Ibbetson, 24, *Sheil-road*.  
 1888 Preston, Arthur J. (G. R. Leyland & Co.), H 19 & 20,  
*Exchange-buildings*.  
 1888 Pride, W. H., 26, *North John-street*.  
 1879 Pritchard, Edward, *Ash Lawn, The Glebe, Blackheath,*  
*London*.

- 1880 Quinn, Hugh, 2, *South John-street*.  
 1880 Quinsey, Thomas, *Matthew-street*.  
 1888 Radcliffe, F. M., 9, *Cook-street*.  
 1854 Radcliffe, Wm., J.P., *Roselands, Woodlands road, Aigburth*.  
 1884 Rankin, J., 10, *Belvedere-road*.  
 1886 Rankine, A. G., 9, *Tithebarn-street*.  
 1886 Rathbone, H. R., B.A., (Bateson, Bright & Warr), 14, *Castle-street*.  
 1888 Rathbone, Oswald H. (The Union Marine Insurance Co.), *Liverpool and London Chambers*.  
 1868 Rathbone, P. H., J.P., *The Cottage, Green Bank*.  
 1888 Rea, Russell, *James-street*.  
 1882 Remfrey, C. J., 88, *Deane-road*.  
 1888 Rensburg, H. E., 2, *Grove Park*.  
 1877 Rennie, John W., 70, *Allington street, Aigburth-road*.  
 1887 Reynolds, Alan S., 80, *Mannering-road*.  
 1888 Reynolds, H. C., *Holton, Blundellsands*.  
 1882 Rock, W., *Widnes*.  
 1868 Ronald, A. W., 19, *Dale-street*.  
 1878 Rouse, R. J., 14, *Grove Park, Lodge-lane*.  
 1878 Royden, T. B., J.P., M.P. (Royden & Sons), *West Side Queen's Dock*.  
 1888 Rudd, W., *Solicitor, Victoria-street*.  
 1871 Russell, E. R., "*Daily Post*" Office, *Victoria-street*.  
 1884 Rutherford, Jno., LL.B., *Victoria-road, Great Crosby*.  
 1882 Rutherford, W. W. (Miller, Peel, Hughes & Co.), *Eberle-street*.  
 1879 Samuel, Jacob, 1, *Rumford-place*.  
 1856 Samuell, C. S., 14, *Canning-street*.  
 1865 Samuell, H. S., 108, *Palmerston-buildings, Old Broad-street, London*.  
 1884 Savage, H. M., 28, *Chapel-street*.  
 1878 Schack-Sommer, G., Ph.D. (Crosfield, Barrow & Co.), 823, *Vauxhall-road*.  
 1874 Scholefield, J. W., J.P. (J. T. Nickels & Co.), *Alexandra-buildings, 19, James-street*.

- 1881 Scott, John R. R. (Wright, Kelso & Co.), 8, *Tower-buildings, Water-street.*
- 1866 Segar, George X., B.A., *Stephenson Chambers, 25, Lord-street.*
- 1878 Seward, James, 2, *Normanby-street.*
- 1888 Shallcross, J. J. (Watson, Dunn & Co.), *Victoria-street.*
- 1888 Shelmerdine, W., 101, *Dale-street.*
- 1880 Simpson, James (Simpson, Morrow & Co.), 8B, *Rumford-place.*
- 1885 Sinclair, James Alfred, 55, *Whitechapel.*
- 1876 Smith, A. G. (Smith, Edwards & Co.), 4, *Chapel-street.*
- 1855 Smith, Elisha, J.P. (Henry Nash & Co.), 14, *Tower-buildings, Water-street.*
- 1881 Smith, Fred. (Grace & Smith), 9, *Harrington-street.*
- 1875 Smith, Henry, *Bank of England, Castle-street.*
- 1888 Smith, H. D., *Adelphi Bank.*
- 1868 Smith, James, *Central Buildings, North John-street.*
- 1856 Smith, Saml., M.P. (Smith, Edwards & Co.), 4, *Chapel-street.*
- 1888 Smith, Wm. A., 141, *Upper Parliament-street.*
- 1867 Snape, Thomas, 10, *Kinglake-street, Edgehill.*
- 1882 Solomon, Lewis (Lionel Hart & Co.), *Irwell Chambers, 4, Fazakerley-street.*
- 1888 Sparrow, J. Audley, 41, *Chapel Chambers.*
- 1855 Spence, Charles, 7, *Tihebarn-street.*
- 1887 Spence, C. H., 29, *Rock Park, Rock Ferry.*
- 1840 Spence, James, 67, *Queensboro'-terrace, Hyde Park, London.*
- 1885 Springmann, Paul, *Drachenfels, West Derby.*
- 1861 Steel, R. B., 8, *Drury-lane.*
- 1866 Steel, Richard, 18, *Hackins-hey.*
- 1887 Stephenson, Arthur Colin, *Rocklands, Blundellsands.*
- 1875 Stevens, C. E. (Harvey, Alsop & Stevens), 14, *Castle-street.*
- 1878 Stewart, W. J., B.A., *Stephenson-chambers, 25, Lord-street.*
- 1880 Stuart, Hahnemann (Stuart & Douglas), 20, *Castle-street.*
- 1888 Stubbs, Rev. C. W., M.A., *Wavertree.*

- 1884 Sumner, Harold (Thames & Mersey Marine Insurance Co.),  
*Liverpool and London Chambers.*
- 1888 Sweny, C. H., 8, *Harrington-street.*
- 1886 Syers, T. D. (Dixon & Syers), *Commerce-court.*
- 1886 Symonds, E. D. (Mason & Grierson), 9, *Cook-street.*
- 1849 Tamplin, F. A., 88, *Gracechurch-street, London.*
- 1873 Tapscott, W. W., 89, *Old Hall-street.*
- 1883 Tate, A. Norman, F.I.C., *Hackins-hey.*
- 1883 Taylor, Austin, B.A. (Hugh Evans & Co), *Old Castle-buildings, 26, Preesons Row.*
- 1875 Taylor, F. Willis, M.A., *Chancery Court, Cook-street.*
- 1876 Taylor, George, 9, *Seel-street.*
- 1882 Taylor, W. E., 179, *Upper Canning-street.*
- 1880 Taylor, W. F., B.A., 5, *Harrington-street.*
- 1868 Thom, Robert (Allan Bros.), *Alexandra-buildings, 19, James-street.*
- 1886 Thomas, A. P., B.A., LL.D., 15, *Lord-street.*
- 1887 Thornley, A. B. (W. Bright & Sons), 5, *Tithebarn-street.*
- 1888 Thurnam, W. D., 61, *Lord-street.*
- 1886 Tillman, J. H. (Geo. Melly & Co.), 20, *Water-street.*
- 1875 Tobias, Henry A., 26, *Brompton Avenue, Sefton Park.*
- 1881 Tyrer, C. T. (J. Smith & Co.), 27, *Exchange Chambers, Bixteth-street.*
- 1878 Tyson, James (Jas. Tyson & Co.), 8, *Manchester-buildings.*
- 1874 Tyson, J. D., *Liverpool and London Chambers.*
- 1849 Unwin, Wm., 9, *Rumford Place.*
- 1884 Vandallo, John J. (Dowie & Co.), *Tower-buildings West.*
- 1887 Veevers, Samuel, 8, *Exchange Court, Exchange-street East.*
- 1875 Wade, John M., 5, *Fenwick street.*
- 1875 Wainwright, H., *Queen Insurance-buildings, 10, Dale-street.*
- 1874 Wainwright, W., 7, *Croxteth-road.*
- 1887 Wallace, John Boyd, *Liverpool and London Chambers.*
- 1884 Waring, S. J., Junr., 42, *Bold-street.*
- 1879 Warr, Augustus F. (Bateson & Co.), 14, *Castle-street.*
- 1881 Waterhouse, J. B., 89, *Catharine-street.*
- 1879 Webb, Geo. H., 62, *Dale-street.*

- 1877 Weightman, W. A. (Field & Weightman), 5, *Fenwick-street*.
- 1887 Weiss, G. W. (Hutton & Co.), *The Temple, Dale-street*.
- 1869 Wevill, F., 46, *Well-lane, Birkenhead*.
- 1878 Whinyates, J. W., 64, *Gill-street*.
- 1852 White, Joseph, 50, *Bell-road, Seacombe*.
- 1884 Whitehead, Thos., *Hanover-street*.
- 1888 White, Frank, *Hyndburn, Aigburth Drive*.
- 1881 Whittle, Glynn, M.A., Cantab., M.D., M.R.C.P., *Oriel House, Prince's Avenue*.
- 1888 Whitty, W. P., B.A., *Rosslyn House, Claremont-road, Seaforth*.
- 1886 Williamson, Archibald (Balfour, Williamson & Co.), 19, *James-street*.
- 1877 Williamson, S., M.P. (Balfour, Williamson & Co.), 19, *James-street*.
- 1886 Williamson, T. G. (G. H. Wakefield & Co.), *Brunswick-st.*
- 1888 Williams, Robt. O., 4, *Coltart-road*.
- 1875 Williams, W. H., 8, *Cable-street*.
- 1888 Wilson, W. Forshaw (Bateson & Co.), 14, *Castle-street*.
- 1861 Woodall, Alfred, 6, *Temple-court*.
- 1881 Woodward, S. C. (E. Young & Co.), 11, *Seel-street*.
- 1884 Woolley, T. A., 30, *Exchange-street East*.
- 1888 Yates, John, B.A., 28, *Greenfield-road, West Derby*.
- 1880 Young, Jas., *Radstock-road, Eln Park, Fairfield*.
- 1874 Zicaliotti, A., 60, *Cable-street*.

